Part 1A: Venture Capital Background: You have an idea for a new firm. You believe that between your great product idea, and your vision as a manager, your firm should be worth $40 million. To start up this new firm, however, you will need to open up new offices, hire staff, and begin production-a process which you believe will require an investment of \$20 million (in present value terms) over the next three years. You do not have $20 million of your own to launch this idea, so you decide to approach a venture capital firm for funding. In order to obtain funding from a venture capital firm, you will need to meet with members of its management team and present a pitch where you outline your product ideas, funding needs, and your overall business plan and strategy. 4. What provisions might the VC firm put into the terms of its equity ownership contract, when it invests in your firm's equity, to protect itself against the potential for agency problems? 5. Although the VC firm knows you will need around $20 million over the next three years, it opts to give you much less than this initially, and progress through your funding in "stages" with various rounds of funding where your firm is given new equity financing at successively higher implied valuations. Why might the VC firm structure your deal like this? What is happening between successive financing rounds, and what role does "imperfect information" play in this deal structure? 6. Most of your compensation as a manager in this early firm comes from your equity ownership of the company. Explain, in general, why awarding managers stock-based compensation aligns managerial incentives with shareholders, while, at the same time, putting shareholders in a position to reward managers for "luck" rather than for "skill." Why might investors not want to reward managers for their lucky breaks