Part 3 of 5 - Game Theory Battle Between Two Chip Firms The following is a classic normal form game that depicts the pricing rivalry between Intel and AMD for their newest top-oftheline microchip. Each company considers ve possible price levels: $449, $3 99, $349, $299 and $249. They decide their prices simultaneously. Monthly prots in millions: AM D 44') 3 9') 34') 299 24') . 7f 45 449 Zilll ltlll 95 40 5\" l 55 35 45 50 25 39 16:) 130 110 IS 25 30 35 20 ..... 34 3i) 120 5 15 m 25 IS .5 in 15 29 m 249 120 in: ms 95 on Question 7 of 10 1 Points Suppose you were AMD's CEO. You are told by your team you have 4 options. I. Make a binding announcement selecting a price ahead of time. (For example, send out written contracts locking in a price for customers you are unable to change. Essentially you get to move first and turn a simultaneous game into a sequential one.) 2. Make a binding announcement to move second by delaying the launch of your product. (Assume Intel must move first and select a price. Essentially you get to move second.) 3. Make a binding announcement to copy whatever price Intel selects. 4. Take no action of any kind and make the decision at the same time (play simultaneously). Which of these options is the offers the highest payoff for AMD? O A. 3. Make a binding announcement to copy whatever price Intel selects. O B. 4. Take no action of any kind and make the decision at the same time (play simultaneously). O C. I. Make a binding announcement selecting a price ahead of time. G) D. 2. Make a binding announcement to move second by delaying the launch of your product so you select a price after Intel. Reset Selection