Part 4: Repeated Games Consider the following stage game: 13. How many pure strategy Nash equilibria does this stage game have? (a (b ) ) (C) (d) 14. Suppose that the stage game above is played for two periods. Assume that the players do not discount the future (that is, 6 = 1). If we want to have (M, C) as the outcome in the rst period of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, we need to consider a certain history-dependent strategy. According to this strategy, what should player 1 play in the second period if (M, C) is not observed in the rst period? (a (b ) ) (C) (d) 15. Keep assuming that the stage game is played for two periods and that the players do not discount the future. Consider again the history dependent strategy that would involve the players playing (M, C) in the rst period of an Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. According to this strategy, what should player 2 play in the second period if (M, C) is absemca'. in the rst period? (a) L (b) C /'\\ D \\-_J in: (d) T