Part D: Sequential Bargaining Game The success of many firms depends on how well they bargain with other firms. For example, firms often must bargain with their suppliers over the prices they pay for inputs. We analyze a simple example of bargaining usinga sequential game, where a firm makes a decision first and then the other firm reacts to that decision. Suppose that Trulmage is a small firm that has developed software that improves how pictures from digital cameras or smartphones are displayed on computer screens. 0 Trulmage currently sells its software only on its Web site and earns profit of $2 million per year. 0 Dell informs Trulmage that it is considering installing the software on every new computer Dell sells. Dell expects to sell more computers at higher price if it can install Truln'lage's software on its computers. 0 The two firms begin bargaining over whatprice Dell will pay Trulmage for its software. 0 In the first stage, Dell offers either $20 or $30 per copy of Trulmage's software. 0 In response to Dell's offer, Trulmage can either accept the offer or don't accept the offer. 0 Trulmage earns a profit of $5 million if Dell offers it a contract of $30 per copy and accepts the contract, while it earns a profit of $3 million if it accepts a contract of $20 per copy. 0 Dell earns a profit of$15 million if it offers a contract price of $20 per copy and Trulmage accepts the contract, while it earns a profit of $10 million if it offers a contract price of $30 per copy and Trulmage accepts the contract. 0 There is no profit to Dell when Trulmage does not accept either contract. 0 Trulmage can threat Dell by telling that it will reject a $20 price l)Construct the extensive game tree using the payoff information for the bargaining game. 2) How will Trulmage respond to Dell's two possible offers? 3) What is the equilibrium outcome in this game'? 4) If Trulmage tells Dell that it will reject their $30 offer, is that a credible threat\