Player 1 Consider the payoff matrix above. and answer the following questions about this game. a) Suppose a: = 4 and y = 4. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? H b) Suppose z = 4 and y = 4. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? U c) Suppose z = 4 and y = 4. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? H d) Suppose I = 4 and y = II]. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? H e) Suppose :I: = 4 and y = 10. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? = 10. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? ~23 Ln C 1:: 'U 0 U1 l'D H | a. DJ :1 ca. \":2