Player 2 C D C 4 4 -1 5 Player 1 tte D 5 -1 0 0 illett Suppose that players simultaneously choose their strat- egy before the repeated game, and can't change it once the repeated game has started. Players can choose one of the three following strategies as defined in class: . Always Defect . Grim-Trigger . Tit-For-Tat (a) Draw the 3x3 matrix game with the payoffs for each strategy pair calculated over the 10 periods. (Each row and each column represent one of the three strategies) (b) What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of game in part (a)?(C) (d) (a) (f) Now suppose now that player 2 make a mistake in period 2. That is if his strategy is supposed to play C then he accidentally plays D, and if his strategy is supposed to play D then he accidentally plays C. Draw the 3X3 matrix game with the payoffs for each strategy pair calculated over the 10 periods. What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of game in part (c)? Now consider the new strategy called Win-Stay, Lose Shift (WSLS): I Start with C c If the other person plays C, then I repeat MY last action 0 If the other person plays D, then I switch MY last action \"That sequence of actions is played if both players play WSLS against each other, and player 2 makes a mistake in period 2. What are the payoffs for each player?I Is this better than when both players play TFT against each other, and player 2 makes a mistake in period 2