Player 2 Player 1 Consider the payoff matrix above, and answer the following questions about this game. a) (0.5 marks) Suppose m : 4 and y : 11. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players) how many strategies remain for Player 1? 4 it One possible correct answer is: 3 h) (0.5 marks) Suppose a: = 4 and y = 11. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? 3 X One possible correct answer is: 2 c) (1 marks) Supposea: = 4 and y : 11. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? 16 at One possible correct answer is: 15 d) (0.5 marks) Supposea: = 4 and y = 11. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 1? 2 v One possible correct answer is: 2 e) (0.5 marks) Suppose a? 2 4 and y : 11. After all strategies that are dominated by a pure strategy are iteratively deleted for both players, how many strategies remain for Player 2? 2 v One possible correct answer is: 2 f) (1 marks) Supposem = 4 and y = 11. What is the sum of both players' payoffs in all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game? 37 V One possible correct answer is: 37