Please Answer #2!

Letting G denote the level of services provided by this good, the marginal value that Ann places on this good per week is given by the function is MVA = 10 - G. Bob's weekly marginal value function is MVs = 8 - G, and Claire's is MVc = 6 - G. All three functions are subject to the additional condition that the minimum marginal value of G for anyone is zero (that is, no one ever gets negative marginal value from any level of G). It follows from this information that the total value Ann places on this good is TVA = 50 - 0.5(10-G)? (with a value of 50 for G>10), while Bob's total value is TV: = 32 - 0.5(8-G)? (with a value of 32 for G>8), and Claire's total value is TVc= 18- (6-G)? (with a value of 18 for G>6). (To see why these are the total value functions, you can draw a diagram for any one person and see how the formula corresponds to the area under the associated MV function at any particular value of G.) The marginal cost of providing a unit of this good is 4 per week. 1. Suppose that anyone can be excluded from consuming the nonrival consumption good, and assume that the good is provided by a single firm with complete monopoly power. If this firm knows each person's total value functions, how what level of G will it provide, and what access fee will it charge to Ann, Bob, and Claire? What will its profits be? Will this be an efficient allocation of resources to the provision of the nonrival good? 2. If this monopoly is forced to charge the same access fee to every potential customer, what fee will it charge? What will its profits be? Will this yield an efficient allocation of resources to the provision of the nonrival good