Please Answer All Parts

3. In a Cournot duopoly, each rm has marginal cost MC = 120, and market demand is On = 300 1/2 p. a. What are the best response functions of each rm? b. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy for each rm (solve for qiand (13) What will be the price in the market? c. How does the total output level compare to the cartel output level? 4. A thief wants the contents of a safe and is threatening the owner, the only person who knows the code to open the safe. The thief threatens "I will kill you if you don't open the safe, and let you live if you do\" Should the owner believe the threat and open the safe? The table shows the value that each person places on possible outcomes. thief Owner Open the safe, thief does not kill 4 3 Open the safe, thief kills 2 1 Do not open, thief kills 1 2 Do not open, thief does not kill 3 4 a. Draw the game tree. Who moves rst? b. What is the subgame perfect lequilibrium