Please answer in a long explanation with references

Q1. India's Transformation After gaining independence from Britain in 1947, India adopted a democratic system of government. The economic system that developed in India after 1947 was a mixed economy characterized by a large number of state-owned enterprises, centralized planning, and subsidies. This system constrained the growth of the private sector. Private companies could expand only with government permission. It could take years to get permission to diversify into a new product. Much of heavy industry, such as auto, chemical, and steel production, was reserved for state-owned enterprises. Production quotas and high tariffs on imports also stunted the development of a healthy private sector, as did labor laws that made it difficult to fire employees. By the early 1990s, it was clear that this system was incapable of delivering the kind of economic progress that many Southeastern Asian nations had started to enjoy. In 1994, India's economy was still smaller than Belgium's, despite having a population of 950 million. Its GDP per capita was a paltry $310; less than half the population could read; only 6 million had access to telephones; only 14 percent had access to clean sanitation; the World Bank estimated that some 40 percent of the world's desperately poor lived in India; and only 2.3 percent of the population had a household income in excess of $2,484. The lack of progress led the government to embark on an ambitious economic reform program. Starting in 1991, much of the industrial licensing system was dismantled, and several areas once closed to the private sector were opened, including electricity generation, parts of the oil industry, steelmaking, air transport, and some areas of the telecommunications industry. Investment by foreign enterprises formerly allowed only grudgingly and subject to arbitrary ceilings, was suddenly welcomed. Approval was made automatic for foreign equity stakes of up to 51 percent in an Indian enterprise, and 100 percent foreign ownership was allowed under certain circumstances. Raw materials and many industrial goods could be freely imported and the maximum tariff that could be levied on imports was reduced from 400 percent to 65 percent. The top income tax rate was also reduced, and corporate tax fell from 57.5 percent to 46 percent in 1994, and then to 35 percent in 1997. The government also announced plans to start privatizing India's state-owned businesses, some 40 percent of which were losing money in the early 1990s. Judged by some measures, the response to these economic reforms has been impressive. The economy expanded at an annual rate of about 6.3 percent from 1994 to 2004, and then accelerated to 9 percent per annum during 2005-2008. Foreign investment, a key indicator of how attractive foreign companies thought the Indian economy was, jumped from $150 million in 1991 to $36.7 billion in 2008. Some economic sectors have done particularly well, such as the information technology sector where India has emerged as a vibrant global center for software development with sales of $50 billion in 2007 (about 5.4 percent of GDP) up from just $150 million in 1990. In pharmaceuticals too, Indian companies are emerging as credible players on the global marketplace, primarily by selling low-cost, generic versions of drugs that have come off patent in the developed world. However, the country still has a long way to go. Attempts to further reduce import tariffs have been stalled by political opposition from employers, employees, and politicians, who fear that if barriers come down, a flood of inexpensive Chinese products will enter India. The privatization program continues to hit speed bumpsthe latest in September 2003 when the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the government could not privatize two state-owned oil companies without explicit approval from the parliament. State owned firms still account for 38 percent of national output in the nonfarm sector, yet India's private firms are 30-40 percent more productive than their state-owned enterprises. There has also been strong resistance to reforming many of India's laws that make it difficult for private business to operate efficiently. For example, labor laws make it almost impossible for firms with more than 100 employees to fire workers, creating a disincentive for entrepreneurs to grow their enterprises beyond 100 employees. Other laws mandate that certain products can be manufactured only by small companies, effectively making it impossible for companies in these industries to attain the scale required to compete internationally.

Case Discussion Questions A. What kind of economic system did India operate under during 1947 to 1990? What kind of system is it moving toward today? What are the impediments to completing this transformation? B. How might widespread public ownership of businesses and extensive government regulations have impacted (1) the efficiency of state and private businesses, and (2) the rate of new business formation in India during the 1947-1990 time frame? How do you think these factors affected the rate of economic growth in India during this time frame? C. How would privatization, deregulation, and the removal of barriers to foreign direct investment affect the efficiency of business, new business formation, and the rate of economic growth in India during the post-1990 time period? D. India now has pockets of strengths in key high technology industries such as software and pharmaceuticals. Why do you think India is developing strength in these areas? How might success in these industries help to generate growth in the other sectors of the Indian economy? E. Given what is now occurring in the Indian economy, do you think the country represents an attractive target for inward investment by foreign multinationals selling consumer products? Why?

Q2. Wal-Mart's Foreign Expansion Wal-Mart, the world's largest retailer, has built its success on a strategy of everyday low prices, and highly efficient operations, logistics, and information systems that keeps inventory to a minimum and ensures against both overstocking and understocking. The company employs some 2.1 million people, operates 4,200 stores in the United States and 3,600 in the rest of the world, and generates sales of almost $400 billion (as of fiscal 2008). Approximately $91 billion of these sales were generated in 15 nations outside of the United States. Facing a slowdown in growth in the United States, Wal-Mart began its international expansion in the early 1990s when it entered Mexico, teaming up in a joint venture with Cifra, Mexico's largest retailer, to open a series of supercenters that sell both groceries and general merchandise. Initially the retailer hit some headwinds in Mexico. It quickly discovered that shopping habits were different. Most people preferred to buy fresh produce at local stores, particularly items like meat, tortillas and pan dulce which didn't keep well overnight (many Mexicans lacked large refrigerators). Many consumers also lacked cars, and did not buy in large volumes as consumers in the United States did. WalMart adjusted its strategy to meet the local conditions, hiring local managers who understood Mexican culture, letting those managers control merchandising strategy, building smaller stores that people could walk to, and offering more fresh produce. At the same time, the company believed that it could gradually change the shopping culture in Mexico, educating consumers by showing them the benefits of its American merchandising culture. After all, Wal-Mart's managers reasoned, people once shopped at small stores in the United States, but starting in the 1950s they increasingly gravitated towards large stores like WalMart. As it built up its distribution systems in Mexico, Wal-Mart was able to lower its own costs, and it passed these on to Mexican consumers in the form of lower prices. The customization, persistence, and low prices paid off. Mexicans started to change their shopping habits. Today Wal-Mart is Mexico's largest retailer and the country is widely considered to be the company's most successful foreign venture. Next Wal-Mart expanded into a number of developed nations, including Britain, Germany and South Korea. There its experiences have been less successful. In all three countries it found itself going head to head against well-established local rivals who had nicely matched their offerings to local shopping habits and consumer preferences. Moreover, consumers in all three countries seemed to have a preference for higher quality merchandise and were not as attracted to Wal-Mart's discount strategy as consumers in the United States and Mexico. After years of losses, Wal-Mart pulled out of Germany and South Korea in 2006. At the same time, it continued to look for retailing opportunities elsewhere, particularly in developing nations where it lacked strong local competitors, where it could gradually alter the shopping culture to its advantage, and where its low price strategy was appealing. Recently, the centerpiece of its international expansion efforts has been China. Wal-Mart opened its first store in China in 1996, but initially expanded very slowly, and by 2006 had only 66 stores. What Wal-Mart discovered, however, was that the Chinese were bargain hunters, and open to the low price strategy and wide selection offered at Wal-Mart stores. Indeed, in terms of their shopping habits, the emerging Chinese middle class seemed more like Americans than Europeans. But to succeed in China, Wal-Mart also found it had to adapt its merchandising and operations strategy to mesh with Chinese culture. One of the things that Wal-Mart has learned is that Chinese consumers insist that food must be freshly harvested, or even killed in front of them. Wal-Mart initially offended Chinese consumers by trying to sell them dead fish, as well as meat packed in Styrofoam and cellophane. Shoppers turned their noses up at what they saw as old merchandise. So Wal-Mart began to display the meat uncovered, installed fish tanks into which shoppers could plunge fishing nets to pull out their evening meal, and began selling live turtles for turtle soup. Sales soared. Wal-Mart has also learned that in China, success requires it to embrace unions. Whereas in the United States Wal-Mart has vigorously resisted unionization, it came to the realization that in China unions don't bargain for labor contracts. Instead, they are an arm of the state, providing funding for the Communist Party and (in the government's view) securing social order. In mid- 2006 Wal-Mart broke with its long standing antagonism to unions and agreed to allow unions in its Chinese stores. Many believe this set the stage for Wal-Mart's most recent move, the purchase in December 2006 of a 35 percent stake in the Trust-Mart chain, which has 101 hypermarkets in 34 cities across China. Now Wal-Mart has proclaimed that China lies at the center of its growth strategy. By early 2009 Wal-Mart had some 243 stores in the country, and despite the global economic slowdown, the company insists that it will continue to open new stores in China at a "double digit rate." Case Discussion Questions A. Do you think Wal-Mart could translate its merchandising strategy wholesale to another country and succeed? If not, why not? B. Why do you think Wal-Mart was successful in Mexico? C. Why do you think Wal-Mart failed in South Korea and Germany? What are the differences between these countries and Mexico? D. What must Wal-Mart do to succeed in China? Is it on track?

Question Three: Read the following article and answer all the questions below: The level of complexity around containing emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases has increased with the ease and increased incidence of global travel, along with greater global social, economic, and political integration. In reference to influenza pandemics, but nonetheless applicable to many communicable and vector-borne diseases, the only certainty is in the growing unpredictability of pandemic-potential infectious disease emergence, origins, characteristics, and the biological pathways through which they propagate. Globalization in trade, increased population mobility, and international travel are seen as some of the main human influences on the emergence, re-emergence, and transmission of infectious diseases in the twenty-first Century. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases have presented major challenges for human health in ancient and modern societies alike. The relative rise in infectious disease mortality and shifting patterns of disease emergence, re-emergence, and transmission in the current era has been attributed to increased global connectedness, among other factors. More globalized countries - and, in particular, global cities - are at the heart of human influence on infectious diseases; these modern, densely populated urban centers are highly interconnected with the world economy in terms of social mobility, trade, and international travel .One might assume that given their high susceptibility to infectious diseases, globalized countries would be more willing than less globalized countries to adopt screening, quarantine, travel restriction, and border control measures during times of mass disease outbreaks. However, given their globalized nature, globalized countries are also likely to favor less protectionist policies in general, thus, contradicting the assumption above, perhaps suggesting that counteracting forces are at play: greater social globalization may require faster policy adoption to limit potential virus import and spread through more socially connected populations ,greater economic globalization may indicate slower policy adoption due to legally binding travel and trade agreements/regulations, economic losses, and social issues due to family relations that cross borders . Greater political globalization may indicate greater willingness to learn from others and/or maintain democratic processes of decision making in global coordination efforts, either way potentially delaying the implementation of travel restrictions. Travel restrictions may also have minimal impact in urban centers with dense populations and travel networks .Moreover, the costs of closing are comparatively higher for open countries than for already protective nations. For example, more globalized countries are more likely to incur financial or economic penalties when implementing health policies which aim to improve the health of local populations such as import restrictions or bans on certain food groups/products and product labelling. Globalization, after all, is known to promote growth and does so via a combination of three main globalization dimensions: economic integration (i.e., flow of goods, capital and services, economic information, and market perceptions), social integration (i.e., proliferation of ideas, information, culture, and people), and political integration (i.e., diffusion of governance and participation in international coordination efforts). Globalization appears to improve population health outcomes such as infant mortality rate (IMR) and life expectancy (LE) regardless of a country's level of development (i.e., developed, developing, or underdeveloped) .Links between the dimensions of globalization (i.e., social, political, and economic) and general population health are less clear cut. For less developed countries, the economic dimension of globalization appears to provide the strongest determinant in IMR and LE, whereas for more developed countries, the social aspect of globalization is the strongest factor .This suggests that as a country becomes more economically stable, it then moves towards greater social and political integration into global society; and for less developed countries, increased wealth creation through economic integration potentially delivers the greatest increases in population health. In contrast, for low- to middle-income countries, the social and political dimensions of globalization appear most strongly related to the propensity of women to be overweight .This suggests that for the least developed countries, the adoption of western culture, food habits and lifestyle may be detrimental to adult health if not backed up by social and political progress. Hence, it appears there is no definite relationship between the different aspects of globalization (i.e., social, political, and economic), a country's level of development, and health outcomes that hold across all health contexts. Regardless, trade policies and more generally, globalization, influence both a nation's determinants of health and the options and resources available to its health policymakers. The influence of open trade agreements, policies favoring globalization and greater social connectedness on the (delayed) timing of travel restrictions during a pandemic would make logical sense. Globalized countries are more likely to incur financial, economic, and social penalties by implementing restrictive measures that aim to improve population health outcomes and hence, will be less inclined to do so. Further, countries that rely on international students and tourism and have a high number of expatriates living and working abroad might be even less likely to close their borders or implement travel restrictions to avoid (1) increases in support payments or decreases in tax income during times of unforeseen economic upset, (2) negative backlash from media and in political polls, and (3) tit-for-tat behaviors from major trading partners. However, countries which are more socially connected may also act more quickly because they are inherently at higher risk of local outbreak and hence, to delay local emergence they may implement international travel restrictions earlier. Membership and commitments to international organizations, treaties, and binding trade agreements might also prevent or inhibit them from legally doing so suggesting there are social, trade, and political motivators to maintain 'open' borders. Domestic policies implemented in response to the coronavirus pandemic have ranged from school closures and public event cancellations to full-scale national lockdowns. Previous research has hinted that democratic countries, particularly those with competitive elections, were quicker to close schools. Interestingly, those with high government effectiveness (i.e., those with high-quality public and civil services, policy formulation, and policy implementation) were slower to implement such policies as were the more right-leaning governments .Further, more democratic countries have tended to be more sensitive to the domestic policy decisions of other countries .In particular, government effectiveness - as a proxy of state capacity - can act as a mediator with evidence available that countries with higher effectiveness took longer to implement COVID-19 related response. Countries with higher levels of health care confidence also exhibit slower mobility responses among its citizens. Those results may indicate that there is a stronger perception that a well-functioning state is able to cope with such a crisis as a global pandemic like SARS-CoV-2. More globalized countries may therefore take advantage of a better functioning state; weighing advantages and disadvantages of policies and, consequently, slowing down the implementation of restrictive travel policies to benefit longer from international activities. Regardless, the need to understand the reasons (and potential confounding or mediating factors) behind the selection of some policy instruments and not others and the associated timing of such decisions is warranted to enable the development and implementation of more appropriate policy interventions. The literature seems to agree that greater globalization (and the trade agreements and openness which often come with it) make a country more susceptible to the emergence and spread of infectious and non-communicable diseases. Greater connectedness and integration within a global society naturally increases the interactions between diverse populations and the pathways through which potential pathogens can travel and hence, emerge in a local population. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (e.g., social distancing, city lockdowns, travel restrictions) may serve as control measures when pharmaceutical options (e.g., vaccines) are not yet available However, such non-pharmaceutical measures are often viewed as restrictive in a social, political, and economic context. Our review of the literature did not detect clear indications of the likelihood that globalized cities will implement such measures, nor were we able to identify how quickly such cities will act to minimize community transmission of infectious diseases and the possible mediating effects of government effectiveness in the decision-making process. Furthermore, our review could not locate research on the relative influence of the social, political, and economic dimensions of globalization on the speed of implementing travel restriction policies. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vast differences in approaches to the control and containment of coronavirus across the world and has demonstrated the varied success of such approaches in minimizing the transmission of coronavirus. Restrictive government policies formerly deemed impossible have been implemented within a matter of months across democratic and autocratic governments alike. This presents a unique opportunity to observe and investigate a plethora of human behavior and decision-making processes. We explore the relative weighting of risks and benefits in globalized countries who balance the economic, social, and political benefits of globalization with a higher risk of coronavirus emergence, spread, and extended exposure. Understanding which factors of globalization (i.e., social, economic, or political) have influenced government public health responses (in the form of travel/border restriction policies) during COVID-19 can help identify useful global coordination mechanisms for future pandemics, and also improve the accuracy of disease modelling and forecasting by incorporation into existing models.

A) What would you expect the impact of Covid-19 on the more globalized countries? B) What was the actual response of more globalized countries to the pandemic? C) What was the cost of closing the more globalized countries as a result of Covid-19? D) Why would the more globalized countries be less inclined to implement restrictive measures?