please answer in detail thanks.

Exercise 2: Collusion in prices Suppose there are three firms producing a homogeneous good, each with a cost function given by (30;) = 493-, i = 1, 2, 3. Firms are playing an innitely repeated game, facing a market demand given by Q(p) = lp'z, where Q = q1 + q: + an. Both rms discount prots with a common discount factor 6 6 [0,1). Unlike the previous exercise, suppose now that competition is through prices. 1 Econ 4631-Industrial Organization HW 3 a) (1 point} If rms were to collude, what would market price and total market output be? If rms were to split production and prots in equal parts, how many units would each rm be producing and what would each rm's prots be? (m: Set up the monopolist's problem) b) (1 point) For which value of :5 will a rm be indifferent between honoring a collusive agreement or cheating on it