please answer it in detail

Suppose there are two rms producing a homogeneous good, each with a cost function given by C (q,) = 361,-, i = 1, 2. Firms are playing an innitely repeated game, facing a market demand given by P(Q) = 150 Q, where Q = q1 + on. Both rms discount prots with a common discount factor 6 E [0, 1). a) (1 point) What is the total discounted prot for each rm, from following a collusive agreement? b) (1 point) Suppose both rms are considering collusion. If rm 1 decides to collude and rm 2 decides to cheat on the agreement, what is rm 2's prot for the period in which it cheats? (Hint: deriving best response functions for each rm will help both the current problem and the next problem) c) (1 point) Consider now a \"trigger\" strategy like the ones we saw in class. What is the total discounted prot associated with cheating? d) (1 point) What is the value of 5 such that both rms are indifferent between following the collusive agree- ment or cheating on it