Please answer Question 2 and 3 in depth

QUESTION 2: Repeated Games (12.5 points) We looked at the \"team member's dilemma\" which is an example of a prisoner's dilemma in a single period game but may lead to cooperation in a multi-period game. Consider a one period game where two team members have two strategies to give high effort or low effort. If both give high effort the payoff is $10,000 for each. If they both give low effort their payoff is $2000 each. If one gives low effort and the other high effort, the one who gives low effort gets $11000 and the one who gives high effort gets 0. Write out a multi period payoff matrix by using the technique used in class. Assume that one who starts with low effort continue with low effort and the others use a \"tit for tat\" strategy. Compute a \"break-even probability\" of future interaction that would induce cooperation. Explain what this probability means. QUESTION 3: Simultaneous and Sequential game (12.5 points) Consider the following payoff matrix, where the payoffs are profits in thousand $. Explanation of payoff: If Player 1 chooses Strategy A and player 2 chooses Strategy B then Player 1 gets $100,000 and Player 2 gets $50,000 Player 2 Strategy A B C A 250, 200 100, S0 170, 280 Player 1 B 260, 140 270,270 130, 130 C 265, 300 120, 130 125, 140 1. Find the Nash equilibrium if the players make the decisions simultaneously. 2. Are there any dominant strategies in the game? 3. Is this a prisoner's dilemma type problem? Explain why. 4. Find the outcome if both players are risk averse and choose a maxi-min strategy. 5. Now consider the game as sequential. How much would player 2 invest to be the first mover? Is there any potential for side payments? (one player offering the other to be 2 mover) If so, who will pay and how much