please answer the above as well as explaining how you reach the answers to help me gain a better understanding of the content

Globogym has a monopoly over the market for personal training and faces a demand curve modelled as P = 400 -0.2Q where is the price of a training session and Q is the number of sessions provided. Their total cost function is given by TC = 1000 + 400. 3.1 Is Globogym a natural monopoly in this scenario? Justify your answer carefully. What does this suggest about the number of firms in this market? [4] 3.2 What are the profit-maximizing price and quantity of sessions in this market? Show all your calculations. How much profit does the company make in equilibrium? [6] Let's assume that the Average Joe's gym enters the market as a competitor providing personal training sessions. In the first year of operations, Globogym and Average Joe's made their decisions about pricing simultaneously. Each firm chooses either pricing high or pricing low, and their interaction is represented in the game table below. The payoff to Globogym is represented in the table by my, and the payoff to Neotel is represented by - Average Joe's Price High ) 160 Price Low Price High IT= 300 T = 240 T-0 Globogym N=0 40 Price Low - 300 160 3.3 Do either of the two telecommunications firms have a dominant strategy in this interaction? If so, what are these dominant strategies? [2] 3.4 What is the Nash Equilibrium of the game above? Clearly show the logic you use to reach your conclusion. What type of game is this? [4] 3.5 Suppose the two firms could incentivize or punish each other, could the two firms find their way to the socially optimum outcome? How would they do this? [4] After observing the strategic interaction between Globogym and Average Joe's, the government decides to pass a law that states that the two terms must pre-commit to the quantities of training sessions they will supply to the South African market. Market demand for training sessions is still modelled as P = 400 -0.20, as before, and the marginal cost of production is constant at R40 per call. Let the number of sessions provided by Globogym be represented by 4s and the quantity provided by Average Joe's be represented by qu. 3.6 Solve for the firms' reaction functions and graph them. How many sessions should Globogym offer if Average Joe's offers 100 sessions? [6] 3.7 Since Globogym operated in the market before Average Joe's, it is allowed to make the first move. Calculate the number of telephone calls supplied by each firm, as well as the market price and quantity of calls. [4) Globogym has a monopoly over the market for personal training and faces a demand curve modelled as P = 400 -0.2Q where is the price of a training session and Q is the number of sessions provided. Their total cost function is given by TC = 1000 + 400. 3.1 Is Globogym a natural monopoly in this scenario? Justify your answer carefully. What does this suggest about the number of firms in this market? [4] 3.2 What are the profit-maximizing price and quantity of sessions in this market? Show all your calculations. How much profit does the company make in equilibrium? [6] Let's assume that the Average Joe's gym enters the market as a competitor providing personal training sessions. In the first year of operations, Globogym and Average Joe's made their decisions about pricing simultaneously. Each firm chooses either pricing high or pricing low, and their interaction is represented in the game table below. The payoff to Globogym is represented in the table by my, and the payoff to Neotel is represented by - Average Joe's Price High ) 160 Price Low Price High IT= 300 T = 240 T-0 Globogym N=0 40 Price Low - 300 160 3.3 Do either of the two telecommunications firms have a dominant strategy in this interaction? If so, what are these dominant strategies? [2] 3.4 What is the Nash Equilibrium of the game above? Clearly show the logic you use to reach your conclusion. What type of game is this? [4] 3.5 Suppose the two firms could incentivize or punish each other, could the two firms find their way to the socially optimum outcome? How would they do this? [4] After observing the strategic interaction between Globogym and Average Joe's, the government decides to pass a law that states that the two terms must pre-commit to the quantities of training sessions they will supply to the South African market. Market demand for training sessions is still modelled as P = 400 -0.20, as before, and the marginal cost of production is constant at R40 per call. Let the number of sessions provided by Globogym be represented by 4s and the quantity provided by Average Joe's be represented by qu. 3.6 Solve for the firms' reaction functions and graph them. How many sessions should Globogym offer if Average Joe's offers 100 sessions? [6] 3.7 Since Globogym operated in the market before Average Joe's, it is allowed to make the first move. Calculate the number of telephone calls supplied by each firm, as well as the market price and quantity of calls. [4)