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Please answer the Question at the end of the case by using the 3-step Problem solving Approach. How to put the 3-step Problem approach in

Please answer the Question at the end of the case by using the 3-step Problem solving Approach.

How to put the 3-step Problem approach in this case?

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Aa Money, Design, and Disaster Assume you're the CEO of a company in which a single product accounts for nearly 80 percent of current sales (worth over $300 billion) and it is the fastest selling in the long and proud history of your company. The product sells for approximately $100 million, and great care was taken in its design with the strategy of ensuring it easily fit with your company's other products which have been purchased by companies around the world. However, this same product is responsible for the deaths of 346 people in just six months. The CEO is Dennis Muilenburg, the company is Boeing, and the product is the 737 Max plane. Every one of these planes sits on the ground across the globe. 82 COSTS TO THE COMPANY The value of the lives lost is of course immeasurable but will require compensation. The quantifiable costs are varied and potentially enormous, such as a drop in the value of the stock, massive legal liabilities from the families of the passengers, and increased scrutiny from regulators. Boeing's reputation is horribly tarnished, to say the least. Confidence in the quality and safety of Boeing's products has been deeply shaken for a range of important stakeholders, notably airline passengers who fly In Boeing's products, investors who buy the company's stock, airlines who purchase the planes, and the pilots and cabin crews who fly them 55OF Search L Sunny ESC X -O-- O-+ EnLock F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 @ & + S % 2 3 4 5 6 8 Q W E R T Y UG & https://prod.reader-ui.prod.mheducation.com/epub/sn_0c285/data-uuid-3d07969a282542c4955fb5f695ede9 Aa and the pilots and cabin crews who fly them. Another stakeholder who thus far has been largely overlooked is Boeing's employees. After all it is they who built, tested, and helped certify the safety of the planes. The crashes call into question their performance, the collaboration between departments, and importantly, management oversight. In addition to the blame cast upon them, they too are concerned and deeply saddened by the loss of life due to the product failures. HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? Facts will no doubt continue to emerge for a long time, but now we know several relevant details. The Max was the latest model in the long line of 737s dating back to the 1960s.83 The Max is more fuel efficient and has longer range than its predecessors, making it more attractive to airlines around the world. These gains are due primarily to larger engines, but they in turn require positioning farther forward and up than the previous models. The design modification causes the plane's nose to tilt upward in some conditions which can cause the plane to stall. To combat this potentially catastrophic event, Boeing created and installed software-Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)-to adjust the nose down. It is now clear the MCAS and Its accompanying sensors did not function properly and wrestled control away from pilots and caused the crashes.84 55OF Search Sunny ESC o+ X F6 F7 F8 F9 F1 F3 F4 FnLock F2 F5 S % & @ 2 3 4 5 6 8Boeing did not appropriately train and inform pilots of the changes, new systems, and potential challenges associated with the Max, engine positioning, and MCAS. 86 Some pilots have since commented that a lack of training and communication related to these types of changes are uncharacteristic of Boeing, meaning historically pilots could trust they would be appropriately informed and trained. Evidence for these deficiencies was revealed in black-box and flight data recordings and in subsequent simulations. These showed pilots of the doomed flights had less than a minute to respond, and when they did, were unable to regain control of the planes due to the MCAS.87 Page 333 WHAT HAPPENED IN THE HANGARS, DESIGN ROOMS, AND IN COUNTLESS MEETINGS? From designers, to their managers, to safety engineers, and regulators, their decision- making criteria and processes failed. Senior leadership's knowledge and involvement is yet to be revealed, but as with the emissions scandals in the auto industry in recent years, it is likely that numerous senior leaders had intimate involvement and knowledge. This could pose personal liability (legal and financial), along with the jobs and reputations of many executives. Some protestors are already calling for CEO Muilenburg to resign. 55 OF Sunny Q Search L Esc X O-- O-+ O EnLock F1 F2 E3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 @ S & 2 3 5 6 8 9 Tab Q W E R T Y U CapsLk A S D F G H CG https://prod.reader-ui.prod.mheducation.com/epub/sn_0c285/data-uuid-3d07969a282542c4955fb5f695ede931 E ( 99 of 273 > Aa Moreover, additional information has come to light showing that Boeing engineers "believed" a key cockpit warning light was a standard feature on all new 737 Max planes. It wasn't. Only the 20 percent of airlines who had purchased the equivalent of a premium package had the working warning light. The light signaled pilots when two key sensors register different readings about the angle of the plane, which suggests there may be a malfunction with the sensors that pilots should investigate. But without the functioning light, it seems pilots of the doomed flights were unaware the sensors malfunctioned, activating the MCAS which dramatically and inappropriately corrected the angle of the planes. This scenario played out in seconds, not minutes, and seems to be a major design flaw and fundamental cause of the fatalities. 88 This scenario was exacerbated by a lack of communication by Boeing. After learning in 2017 the lights didn't function on all planes, Boeing conducted internal tests and concluded the planes were still safe and no action was necessary. Because of this the company did not notify airlines, pilots, or the FAA. 89 Boeing's troubles, however, are broader and deeper than the 737 Max. Production processes and practices for its 787 Dreamliner have been scrutinized for years. (Remember the battery fires that grounded those planes in 2013? The fixes were much more complex than software.) Company norms were strong and clear, such that criticisms of key products were discouraged and or ignored. Numerous reports exist of 55OF Sunny Q Search Esc X O-+ EnLock F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F10 @ S o & 2 3 4 5 6 18 Tab Q W E R T Y A SG https://prod.reader-ui.prod.mheducation.com/epub/sn_0c285/data-uuid-3d07969a282542c4955fb5f695ede (99 of 273 ) Aa criticisms of key products were discouraged and or ignored. Numerous reports exist of employees being intimidated and, in some instances, retaliated against for speaking up. Critics, some of whom are current and former employees, claim the company values production speed over quality, and similar concerns motivated Qatar airlines to stop accepting planes from a plant in South Carolina. Many now wonder if this reflects deeply embedded cultural problems throughout Boeing and its products.91 CURRENT PREDICAMENT For the Max to fly again, Boeing must develop and implement a software fix, and have this certified by the FAA, which will take several months. Many people both inside and outside the airline industry doubt that will be enough. Trust is gone. As stated by Ross Aimer, aviation consultant and former Boeing training captain: " Boeing in the past always told the pilots and airlines exactly what was on those airplanes. . . . I have been a Boeing pilot for over 50 years and have loved their products, but they have lost my trust." He further said he feels Boeing was purely profit focused in these decisions. A survey showed that 53 percent of American adults would rather not fly in the 737 Max even when it is approved for service.92 Mr. Muilenburg realizes the magnitude of the situation and began what is sure to be a lona aboloav and trust re-building tour. But again. many experts question whether he 55OF Sunny Q Search Esc X FnLock F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F9 S & 2 3 4 6 8 Q W F T explain why this is a cause of the problem. Asking why multiple times is more likely to lead you to root causes of the problem. For example, do executive characteristics help explain the problem you defined in Step 1? B. Follow the same process for the situation factors. For each ask yourself, why is this a cause? By asking why multiple times you are likely to arrive at a complete and more accurate list of causes. Again, look to the Organizing Framework for this chapter for guidance. Did particular policies or practices play a role? C. Now consider the Processes box in the Organizing Framework. Are any processes at the individual, gloup/team, or organizational level potential causes of your defined problem? For any process you consider, ask yourself, why is this a cause? Again, do this for several iterations to arrive at the root causes. D. To check the accuracy or appropriateness of the causes, be sure to map them onto the defined problem and confirm the link or cause and effect connection. STEP 3: Recommend solutions. Make your recommendations for solving the problem. Consider whether you want to resolve it, solve it, or dissolve it (see ) Section 1.5). Which recommendation is desirable and feasible? A. Given the causes you identified in Step 2, what are your best recommendations? Use Search Sunny ESC 1- X O-- FnLock F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 @ S Vo & 2 4 5https://prod.reader-ui.prod.mheducation.com/epub/sn_0c285/data-uuid-3d07969a282542c4955fb5f695ede931 99 of 273 Aa C. NUVE CUTISTGET TIE PROCESSES DOX III LIE VIyallIZIly TITTIEWork. Are ally processes au the individual, group/team, or organizational level potential causes of your defined problem? For any process you consider, ask yourself, why is this a cause? Again, do this for several iterations to arrive at the root causes. D. To check the accuracy or appropriateness of the causes, be sure to map them onto the defined problem and confirm the link or cause and effect connection. STEP 3: Recommend solutions. Make your recommendations for solving the problem. Consider whether you want to resolve it, solve it, or dissolve it (see ) Section 1.5). Which recommendation is desirable and feasible? A. Given the causes you identified in Step 2, what are your best recommendations? Use material in the current chapter that best suits the cause. Consider the OB in Action and Applying OB boxes, because these contain insights into what others have done. B. Be sure to consider the Organizing Framework-both person and situation factors- as well as processes at different levels. C. Create an action plan for implementing your recommendations and be sure your recommendations map onto the causes and resolve the problem. 55OF Search Sunny ESC 1 - X O FnLock F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 Fg S % & 2 4 5 6 8 Q W E R( Q C] https://prod.readerui.prod.m heducation.com/epub/sn_0c285/datauuid73d07969a282542c495 5fb5f69Sede931 :: ,9 A3 _ ,9 A3 _

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