Brief Charles and April Land v. Yamaha Motor Corporation, in the required case brief format by July 5, 2018.

Required case format :

1. FACTS: This section will constitute a very short (two or three sentences) summary of the events that brought the parties to the courtroom.

2. ISSUE: This is the legal issue that the court is being asked to resolve.

3. HOLDING: This is the rule of law pronounced by the court as it applies to the facts of the particular case. This is the portion of the court's written opinion that has precedential authority to lower courts in the same jurisdiction.

4. REASONING: In this section we will relate the court's logic in reaching its decision. Please be sure to acknowledge the opposing arguments and explain why one prevailed over the other.

Case:

Flaum, Chief Judge. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A.(“YMUS”) and Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. (“YMC”), holding plaintiffs Charles and April Land’s productliability suit [was] barred by the Indiana Statute of [Limitations]

When appellant Charles Land, an Indiana resident, attempted to start a Yamaha WaveRunner Model WR500G on Heritage Lake in Indiana on June 25, 1998,the vehicle exploded and caused Land permanent backinjury. The plaintiffs contend that the WaveRunnerwas defective in design: it allowed fuel fumes to accu-mulate in the hull of the boat, posing serious risk offire upon ignition…. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the district court assumed that the plaintiffs could prove their product liability claim onthe merits. That is, it assumed that when the WaveRunner left the possession and control of the defen-dants, it was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to anticipated users. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the Lands filed suit on December 23,1999, and that both the injury and the filing of the suit occurred more than ten years after the WaveRunner was delivered to Wallace Richardson, the first user.The Indiana Statute of Repose provides in relevant part that product liability actions must be commenced within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer. YMC, a Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in Japan, designed,manufactured, and tested the WaveRunner in Japan.It petitioned for an exemption from the United States Coast Guard’s requirement that every vehicle like the WaveRunner have a fan to ventilate fuel fumes out of the hull of the boat.YMUS knew of the test results,and,according to the Lands, gave false information to the Coast Guard as to the known danger of the WaveRun-ner design in order to keep its exemption from the fan requirement. YMUS, which maintains its principal place of business in California, participated in developing the WaveRunner and imported it to the United States.YMUS, while it has no office in Indiana, is authorized and does business in the state. On July 7, 1987, YMUS sold and shipped the vehicle to a boating store in Kentucky. On July 28, 1987, Wallace Richardson, an Indiana resident, purchased the WaveRunner. Larry Bush, another Indiana resident, subsequently bought the WaveRunner in 1989 or 1990. Bush was the registered owner when the WaveRunner caused Land’s injury. From the time of Bush’s purchase, the boat was registered, garaged, and serviced in Indiana.Between 1988 and 1998, 24 other WaveRunners were reported to have exploded. YMUS twice recalled certain models of WaveRunners for modifications to reduce the likelihood of fuel leakage. It never recalled the WR500 series….Appellants argue that although they did not commence their action until well over ten years after delivery to the initial user, their case is not barred because … California law, which includes no statute of repose, governs the action….We review a grant of summary judgment de novo [i.e., take a fresh look at the evidence], construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party…. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law…. Choice of Law A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must applythe substantive law of the state in which it sits, 304 U.S.64… (1938)….The Erie doctrine extends to choice-of-law principles and requires the court to apply the conflicts rules of the forum state…. Therefore, the district court properly applied the choice-of-law rule of Indiana.Indiana applies a two-step conflicts analysis. Hubbard Mfg. v. Greeson (Ind. 1987). First, the courtmust determine if the place where the last event necessary to make the defendant liable—that is, the placeof the injury—is insignificant…. If it is not, the law ofthat state applies…. Only if the court finds that the place of injury is insignificant does it move to step twowhich requires the court to consider “other factors such as: 1) the place where the conduct causing theinjury occurred; 2) the residence or place of business ofthe parties; and 3) the place where the relationship iscentered.”… In the instant case, we, like the district court, arrive at the inevitable conclusion that the placeof the injury—Indiana—is not insignificant. Therefore,we apply Indiana law and need not address the second prong in Indiana’s choice-of-law analysis….Charles Land was injured while operating theWaveRunner in Indiana. He was a resident of Indiana,the owner of the boat was a resident of Indiana, andthe boat had been garaged and serviced in Indiana fora decade before it caused Land’s injury. No evidence exists in the record that the WaveRunner was everused outside of Indiana. It was not mere fortuity that the injury occurred in Indiana, as the Lands suggest by comparing this choice-of-law determination with those involving pass-through automobile or airplane accidents in which the place of the injury is given littleweight, and the argument that Indiana’s contacts havelittle or no relevance to the legal action simply cannot withstand scrutiny. Therefore, our analysis of Indiana choice-of-law policy must end with step one.The Lands argue that California, where YMUS was incorporated and where the defendant’s tortious conduct occurred, has greater relevance.Maybe so…. This analysis belongs in step two of the Indiana conflicts policy, however, which we cannot reach. Some states use the “most significant relationship” approach suggested by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. If Indiana didso, we would skip step one of our analysis and instead isolate the pertinent issue, examine each state’s connection to the occurrence, identify the governmental policies espoused by each state relevant to the issue,and proclaim applicable the law of the state with the superior interest.”… That case might have a different outcome from the one at hand. Indiana does not adhere to the most significant relationship analysis, however, and the Supreme Court of Indiana has not signaled that it intends to overrule Hubbard. Although Hubbard does note some discomfort with the rigid place of injury, or lex loci delicti, approach, it still adheres to ananalysis that uses the place of injury as a baseline…. If the place of injury is not insignificant, we must apply its law regardless of the greater interest another state may have. The Lands propose an approach whereby the law of the place of the tortious conduct is controlling in product liability cases. The stateof Indiana has given us no indication that it intends to change its choice-of-law policy to reach such a result, and we decline to make that policy decision for it. Indiana’s contacts to this case are not insignificant. Therefore, its law, including the Statute of Repose, applies.Because Indiana law governs this case and because the Indiana Statute of Repose bars productliability actions that, like this one, are brought more than ten years after delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer, we find that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We AFFIRM.