Please can you solve all parts of the question providing an easy step-by-step analysis on how to do each part of the question. Your help is very much appreciated and thank you for your efforts.

An incumbent firm faces the possibility of entry by a challenger. The challenger may enter or not. If the challenger enters, the incumbent may choose to accommodate the challenger or instead to fight (perhaps via a price war). Suppose the challenger gets a payoff of 1 if he does not enter, gets a payoff of 2 if he enters and the incumbent accommodates him, but gets a payoff of 0 if he enters and the incumbent fights. Suppose the Incumbent gets a payoff of 2 if the challenger does not enter. If the challenger enters, the incumbent gets a payoff of 1 if he accommodates the challenger and a payoff of 1 if he fights the challenger. b) Is this a game of perfect or imperfect information? (2 Marks) c) Find all the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of this game (4 Marks) d) Find all the (pure strategy) Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria of this game (4 Marks) e)Are the number of Nash equilibria and Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria different here? why/why not? (4 Marks) An incumbent firm faces the possibility of entry by a challenger. The challenger may enter or not. If the challenger enters, the incumbent may choose to accommodate the challenger or instead to fight (perhaps via a price war). Suppose the challenger gets a payoff of 1 if he does not enter, gets a payoff of 2 if he enters and the incumbent accommodates him, but gets a payoff of 0 if he enters and the incumbent fights. Suppose the Incumbent gets a payoff of 2 if the challenger does not enter. If the challenger enters, the incumbent gets a payoff of 1 if he accommodates the challenger and a payoff of 1 if he fights the challenger. b) Is this a game of perfect or imperfect information? (2 Marks) c) Find all the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of this game (4 Marks) d) Find all the (pure strategy) Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria of this game (4 Marks) e)Are the number of Nash equilibria and Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria different here? why/why not? (4 Marks)