Please complete all parts please

Consider a market with two identical firms: Firm A and Firm B. . The market demand is P = 58 - 2Q, where Q = qA + qB and the firms cost structure is such that MCA = MCB = ACA = ACB = 4. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium results in firm outputs of qA = 9 and qB = 9. Market price is PC-N = $22 and the firms earn profits of TA = $162 and TB = $162. . If these firms were to act as a cartel (perfect collusion) maximizing joint profit, the output for each firm is 6.75, market price is PCartel = $31 and each firm earns profit of $182.25. Suppose now that the firms act as perfect competitors. What are firm outputs, market price and profits? (Round to 2 decimal places.) (a) qA (b) qB (c) PPC (d) TA= (e) TB (f) Use your answers in (a)-(e) and those provided in the question above to rank according to allocation efficiency the three equilibria (Cournot, perfect collusion, and perfect competition). Rank each using 1 for best and 3 for worst. Equilibrium Rank (1, 2, or 3) Cournot-Nash Perfect Collusion Perfect Competition