Please conduct a case brief of this case, I want to make sure I am correct. for my personal reference

LINDA K. LAGER, JUDGE. Pawlowski was a freshman at Quinnipiac University, located in Hamden, Connecticut. During the evening of November 9, 2001 and into the early morning hours of November 10, 2001, a party was held off campus at 3327 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, Connecticut. The residents of 3327 Whitney Avenue were current Quinnipiac University students, and all had a past or present affiliation with the university's officially recognized chapter of the Delta Sigma Phi fraternity (DSP). Beer and alcohol were served at the party. Pawlowski attended the party. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on November 10, 2001 he left the party intoxicated, with a blood alcohol level of .19%, and while crossing Whitney Avenue mid-block was struck by a motor vehicle driven by Ryan DePaolo. Pawlowski died as a result of the injuries he sustained. The university issued a Student Handbook (Handbook) to students enrolled for the 2001-2002 school year. The Handbook had a specific alcohol policy that, among other things, prohibited "purchase, possession or consumption, regardless of location, of beer, wine or distilled spirits by person under age of 21." The policy also provided that students over the age of 21 "may not distribute, serve or procure alcohol to/for minors." While the policy in general regulated consumption of alcohol on campus, in university-owned or leased residences, and in athletic fields and their adjacent areas such as parking lots, the policy contained the following specific prohibition: "The consumption and serving of alcoholic beverages at organized social functions that are held off campus and sponsored by university student clubs or organizations is strictly prohibited to those under the age of 21." The Handbook states that the university reserved "the right to review and address incidents that occur off campus in which Quinnipiac students are involved. Behavior which impacts the institution will be addressed through the university's judicial system." There had been problems in the past when DSP members had hosted off-campus parties where alcohol was served to persons under the age of 21. In the fall of 2000, university representatives met with eight members of DSP and warned them about hosting parties where alcohol was served to minors. Two of those individuals, Christopher Thoman and Conor Melville, are defendants in this case. [Next, the court addresses the potential liability of the university.] If a court determines that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant. As a general rule, there is no affirmative duty of protection. However there are exceptions to this rule, creating a duty to protect if (1) it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff "would rely upon the defendant's continued provision of services necessary for the plaintiff's protection;" or (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that a defendant's actions increased the risk of physical harm to a plaintiff. Generally, courts that have found a duty to protect base it on the university's affirmative conduct. For example, in Mullins v. Pine Manor College the court found that the plaintiff, a first year student,

could rely on the security measures that the college had in place, including a fence around the campus, the presence of security guards, exterior gates and doors that were to be locked between the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. and a visitor escort policy, to protect her from being attacked and raped on the campus as she was around 4:30 a.m. one morning. Indeed, the court found that the college's requirement that freshmen live on campus was an implied "representation that the college believed it could provide adequately for the safety and well-being of its students." The college's affirmative conduct in providing security measures and its negligence on the night in question made the plaintiff more vulnerable than if no measures had been in place. Similarly, in McClure v. Fairfield University (CT 2003) the court found that the university's affirmative conduct in providing a "safe rides" program using university vans to transport students to and from the beach area where the plaintiff student was injured created a duty to protect. The fact that the university had a shuttle service in place foreseeably could have led the plaintiff to change his conduct in reliance on the program and thus be on foot in the beach area at the time he was struck by an automobile. The university's affirmative conduct in providing the shuttle service, combined with its negligence in not always making it available, placed the plaintiff at greater risk than if it had not provided the transportation in the first instance. Here, there is no evidence that the university took any affirmative steps that increased the risk of harm to Pawlowski or that Pawlowski affirmatively relied on anything the university did or represented and therefore did not take steps to protect himself. The claims against the university are that it failed to act to protect Pawlowski from harm, by failing to investigate or monitor DSP, failing to enforce or adopt rules regarding the operation of fraternities, failing to implement measures to prevent underage drinking on campus, failing to provide transportation to and from off-campus parties, failing to supervise off-campus drinking and failing to enforce its rules against underage drinking, do not provide a basis for a legal duty to protect. The plaintiffs are left with the assertion that the university knew or should have known that failing to effectively enforce its alcohol policy against DSP would lead to foreseeable harm to Pawlowski. In fact, the actual causes of the harm included Pawlowski's excess consumption of alcohol and his decision to cross a major street mid-block. These causes are separate from the university's conduct in enforcing its policies and procedures. This court cannot conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable to the university that the manner in which it enforced its alcohol policy and its past disciplinary actions against certain DSP members enhanced the risk of harm that Pawlowski faced, created a new risk or induced him to forego some opportunity to avoid risk on the night in question. Thus, there is no basis for finding a legally foreseeable duty on the part of the university. This court is mindful that any duty imposed on a university to proactively protect students engaged in off-campus private recreational activities "creates significant risks of affecting conduct in ways that are undesirable as a matter of policy." Imposition of such a duty is contrary to the modern view that colleges and universities do not have a duty to act as custodians of their students. Up until the late 1970's, under the in loco parentis doctrine, a university had a custodial relationship over its students. It exercised stringent control over student conduct but, in exchange, was required to provide certain protections to the students. Since the late 1970s, the general rule is that no special relationship exists between a college and its students because a college is not an insurer of the safety of its students. The proper goal of postsecondary education the maturation of the students. Only by giving them responsibilities can students grow into responsible adulthood. Since the plaintiffs seek

to extend the university's affirmative control of student behavior to students living privately off- campus, there is the potential for restrictions that could be far more extensive than those in effect when the doctrine of in loco parentis governed the university-student relationship. Recognition of a duty on the facts presented here would inevitably require the university to restrict the private recreational activities of its students. Additionally, a conclusion that a legal duty arises based on policies contained in a student handbook could potentially discourage institutions of higher education from having policies that govern such things such as students' alcohol consumption and students' unlawful behavior. If the absence of a policy means the absence of any duty, a rational institution could opt for laxity over enforcement to the detriment of its student population. Thus, recognizing a duty under the circumstances presented by this case poses a risk of a university engaging in either over enforcement, i.e., excessive control, or under enforcement, i.e., no control, of its students' private off-campus recreational activities. Neither of these are desirable outcomes. As desirable as it may be to address the serious problem of students' underage drinking and its adverse consequences, courts recognize that it is "difficult to so police a modern university campus as to eradicate alcohol ingestion." Baldwin v. Zoradi (CA 1981). As a practical matter, it may be impossible for a university to police students' off-campus alcohol consumption. The practical limitations on the proactive measures a university may be able to undertake, combined with the attendant costs of such measures, further militates against finding any duty on the part of the university. The motion for summary judgment is granted