please explain clearly and step by step
4) In a small country, there are two mobile-phone companies, Samsung and Huawei. During this period, each ofthem plans to introduce a new model to this new market. Samsung has four choices to select {FL4, S23, NT23, and A53}; and Huawei has four choices to select (P60, MT60, RNS, and NVS}. The following table represents the expected payoffs or prots {in million USS) from their competition in this market. Huawei FL4 (3s, 41) (45,35) (40,42) (3?,36) Samsung (33, 42) (41 ,33) (32.44) (39,40) NT23 (34,)44 (44,43) (33,42) (34,41) (35,)42 (46,40) (3943) (32,44) From the above normal form game, 4.] Identify the equilibrium outcome and the pay-off ofeach company at the equilibrium outcome. You must also identify the strongest or best outcome concept that you use for deriving the equilibrium outcome, and explain about the process used for deriving it. 4.2 Suppose that the game condition is changed. Now Huawei has only 3 available choices to choose 9 P60, MTl}, and RNS; and Samsung also has 3 choices 9 323, NTZS, and A53. The expected payoffs or prots for this new game are the same as the original game, for example if Samsung picks S23 and Huawei picks P60, then the payoffs will be (33,42). Identify the equilibrium outcome and the pay-offof each company at the equilibrium outcome ofthis new game. You must also identify the strongest or best outcome concept that you use for deriving the equilibrium outcome, and briefly explain the process used to derive it. 4.3 Suppose that the game condition is changed again. New, Samsung has only 2 available choices to choose 9 NT23 and A53; and Huawei has also only 2 choices 9 RN33 and NVS. The expected payolfs or prots for this new game are the same as the original game. However, this new game is a SEQUENTIAL game, where Samsung will make decision rst, and Huawei will make decision after. Each ofthem will make decision one time only. Determine the equilibrium outcome ofthis game, by identifying the strategy that each company will select and its pay-off at that equilibrium outcome. You must also show the decision tree to support your answer. (24 points}