Please explain

We consider the following two-player strategic form game, where Alice's strategies are U,C, and D, and Bob's strategies are L, M, and R, and Carol's strategies are A and B. Carol's strategy consists of choosing which table will be used for the payoffs, Table A or Table B.Table A is below, where for each cell the first number is Alice's payoff, the second number is Bob's payoff and the third number is Carol's payoff. Table B is below, where again, for each cell, the first number is Alice's payoff, the second number is Bob's payoff and the third number is Carol's payoff. This game may not have any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, or it may have one or more equilibria. How many Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) does this game have? We consider the following two-player strategic form game, where Alice's strategies are U,C, and D, and Bob's strategies are L, M, and R, and Carol's strategies are A and B. Carol's strategy consists of choosing which table will be used for the payoffs, Table A or Table B.Table A is below, where for each cell the first number is Alice's payoff, the second number is Bob's payoff and the third number is Carol's payoff. Table B is below, where again, for each cell, the first number is Alice's payoff, the second number is Bob's payoff and the third number is Carol's payoff. This game may not have any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, or it may have one or more equilibria. How many Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) does this game have