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Please give me steps by steps answers. Thanks! QUESTION 2 (40 possible points, 20 points each of 2 parts): Consider a market populated by only

Please give me steps by steps answers. Thanks!

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QUESTION 2 (40 possible points, 20 points each of 2 parts): Consider a market populated by only two firms, i = A, B. They produce and sell an identical product at the same cost: c(qi) = c X qi, where c = $60 for each firm i = A, B. Furthermore, they face the same market constraint, P(Q) - 240 - 10Q, where Q = qA + qB. 1. Assuming that the two firms compete in prices ( PA, PB ), find the one-shot, Bertrand- Nash equilibrium, in terms of (i) prices, (ii) quantities produced, and (iii) profits for each firm. 2. Now suppose the two firms compete in quantities ( qA, B). Find the one-shot, Cournot-Nash equilibrium, in terms of (i) prices, (ii) quantities produced, and (iii) profits for each firm

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