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Please help and explain responses if possible: Questions 1. The Gulf Sea Turtle Conservation Group (GSTCG), a non-profit group of volunteers working to collect data

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Questions 1. The Gulf Sea Turtle Conservation Group (GSTCG), a non-profit group of volunteers working to collect data on nesting sea turtles and to promote sea turtle conservation, is considering creating a video to educate people about sea turtle conservation. The cost of duplicating the video on a DVD and mailing the DVD to anyone is $5.56. In a GSTCG member meeting, the video plan was discussed. The first two columns of Table 1 show the expected demand for the DVD at different suggested donation levels, and they can act as a single-price monopolist if they choose to. The receipts will be used to fund GSTCG supplies for their data collection and conservation work. At the end of each sea turtle nesting season, any excess funds are donated by the GSTCG to a local non-profit sea turtle research and rehabilitation facility. a. Complete Table 1 by computing the Total Revenue, Marginal Revenue, Total Cost, and Profit columns, each rounded to two decimal places. The cost of duplicating a video on a DVD and mailing the DVD, the Marginal Cost, is $5.56. (1 point) Table 1 Anticipated Suggested Number of DVD Total Marginal Donatlon per Requests Revenue Revenue Total Cost Profit DVD Request $19.00 0 $0.00 20 b. The president wants the GSTCG to provide videos to generate the most possible donations (Total Revenue]. What price is the president of the GSTCG favoring and how many people will receive the DVD if this becomes the price of the suggested donation? Explain your answer. c. The Education Outreach Committee wants the GSTCG to provide videos to the most possible number of people. What price is the Educational Outreach Committee favoring and how many people will receive the DVD if this becomes the price of the suggested donation? Explain your answer. d. The treasurer of the GSTCG wants the DVD program to be as efficient as possible so that the marginal revenue equals marginal cost. What price is the treasurer favoring and how many people will receive the DVD if this becomes the price of the suggested donation? Explain your answer. e. The Fundraising Committee wants the DVD program to generate as much profit in donations as possible. What price is the Fundraising Committee favoring and how many people will receive the DVD if this becomes the price of the suggested donation? Explain your answer. 2. Imagine an Island a short distance off the east coast of a country. This island is called Onus, and it has a population of about 500 residents. Their only way to the mainland is by the ONE ferry boat that runs between Onus and the mainland (the ferry operates as a monopoly). Similarly, a short distance off the west coast of the same country is another island, Yuri, with a similar population of about 500 residents. Yuri, however, is a tourist attraction. There are MANY ferry boats running between Yuri and the mainland (each ferry operating in this perfectly competitive market). Each Yuri ferry operator provides service to both the tourists and to the 500 west coast island residents. Using the information that you learned in Chapter 13 of the text, answer the following questions by comparing and contrasting the differences between the monopoly market in Onus and the perfectly competitive market in Yuri. a. Explain in detail what differences in demand that the monopoly ferry operator on the east coast island of Onus will experience compared to the demand that a single ferry operator will experience in the perfectly competitive west coast market of Yuri. $45.00 D Monopoly $40.00 MC $35.00 $30.00 $25.00 ATC $20.00 AVC $15.00 $10.00 $5.00 MR $0.00 15 19 36 51 64 QUANTITY 75 84 91 96 $45.00 Firm In A Perfectly Competitive Market $40.00 MC $35.00 $30.00 $25.00 $20.0 D $15.00 $10.00 $5.00 AFC 10.00 15 19 36 64 QUANTITY 75 84 91 96b. Both the Onus ferry operator in the monopoly market and each of the Yuri ferry operators in the perfectly competitive market will want to produce at the point that the marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost. Explain in detail the two reasons that the monopoly's marginal revenue will always be less than its price while the marginal revenue in the perfectly competitive market will always be equal to the market price. $45.00 D. Monopoly $40.00 MC $35.00 $30.00 $25.00 $20.00 ATC AVC $15.00 $10.00 $5.00 MR not equal D D $0.00 MR 15 19 36 QUANTITY 75 84 91 96 $45.00 Firm In A Perfectly Competitive Market $40.00 In Which The Equilibrium Price Is Equal To MC The Firm's Lowest ATC. $35.00 $30.00 $25.00 $20.00 ATC D & MR DAVC $15.00 $10.00 $5.00 AFC $0.00 15 61 36 QUANTITY 75 84 91 96c. Explain in detail how the monopoly ferry operator will determine the quantity of ferry service that she will provide to the 500 residents of Onus. Also explain how that monopoly quantity will compare to the total quantity of ferry service available to the 500 residents of the perfectly competitive market of Yuri by ALL the Yuri ferry providers. $45.00 D Monopoly - No Government Intervention. $40.00 MC $35.00 $30.00 $25.00 D $20.00 ATC AVC $15.00 $10.00 $5.00 D AFC $0.00 MR 15 19 36 QUANTITY 64 75 84 91 96 $45.00 Firm In A Perfectly Competitive Market $40.00 In Which The Equilibrium Price Is Equal To MC $35.00 The Firm's Lowest ATC. $30.00 $25.00 $20.00 ATC D & MR DAVC $15.00 $10.00 $5.00 AFC $0.00 15 19 36 51 64 QUANTITY 75 84 91 96d. Explain in detail how the monopoly ferry operator in Onus will determine the price she will charge the island residents for ferry service and how that price will differ from the price experienced by the island residents and tourists in the perfectly competitive market of Yuri. $45.00 Monopoly - No Government Intervention. $40.00 MC $35.00 $30.00 $25.00 C D $20.00 ATC AVC $15.00 $10.00 $5.00 D $0.00 MR AFC 15 19 36 QUANTITY 75 84 $45.00 Firm In A Perfectly Competitive Market $40.00 In Which The Equilibrium Price Is Equal To MC $35.00 The Firm's Lowest ATC. $30.00 $25.00 $20.00 ATC D & MR DAVC $15.00 $10.00 $5.00 AFC $0.00 15 19 36 QUANTITY 75 84 91 963. Onus residents, in questions 2.a.d. above, complain to their local politicians about the high prices. In an attempt to reduce the exorbitant price that the residents must pay for ferry service to and from the mainland, the local politicians convince the legislature to create a regulatory board which will impose a legal price ceiling on the Onus monopoly ferry operator. a. In this scenario, the regulatory board imposed a price ceiling on the Onus monopoly ferry operator that was calculated to be below the ferry operator's lowest ATC, but well above its lowest AVC. Explain in significant detail, what will be the short run and long run impacts of such a price ceiling on the Onus monopoly ferry operator's profits and continued ability to provide service to the inhabitants of the island of Onus. - iv: llllll' .'lllh- '1 .. E E'EIEEEIIEH II I i g i I E E71 = E m llll' l b. In this scenario, the regulatory board imposed a price ceiling on the Onus monopoly ferry operator that was calculated to be well above the ferry owner's lowest AVC and equal to the ferry owner's lowest ATC. Explain in significant detail, what will be the short run and long run impacts of such a price ceiling on the Onus monopoly ferry operator's profits and continued ability to provide service to the inhabitants of the island of Onus. a a FIIII ngmulll In IIIIEE a'lan IEIHI Quill-I EIEII. l Ill Q II __ II _ 0174! l Elllllllll F'IIIV g EEIEEIIE 9 c. In this scenario, the regulatory board, imposed a price ceiling on the Onus ferry operator that was calculated to be weli above the ferry owner's lowest AVC and well above the ferry owner's lowest ATC. Explain in significant detail, what will be the short run and long run impacts of such a price ceiling on the Onus monopoly ferry operator's profits and continued ability to provide service to the inhabitants of the east coast island of Onus. llla l _. aim lIII llll ' ,1 i [A'Ill l: l .5\" I 'l Elaalli Ill l 3 IF II III 2 a -- .- E- oEE .Mz '01- '1' E! emu 4. Dr. Fine and Dr. Feelgood are the only two medical doctors offering immediate walk-in medical services in a small rural town. They operate in a two firm oligopoly. Each doctor can charge either a high price or a low price for a standard medical visit. Figure 1 shows their possible profits, based on each doctor's pricing strategy. Figure 1 a. Using the information in Question 4 and Figure 1 above, explain why the Nash Noncooperative Equilibrium pricing strategy is the safest choice when there is only a single period in which to choose a price and the likely actions of the competitor are unknown. b. Using the information in Question 4 and Figure 1 above, complete the following table to depict the two period pricing situation when Dr. Fine always plays \"Tit-for-Tat" and Dr. Feelgood always plays "Tit-for-Tat." Payoffs SECO N D Period Pa yoffs TOTAL FIRST Perlod Payoffs Charges Charges (high or low) (high or low) Fine Fine ' Feelgood Feelgood ' c. Using the information in Question 4 and Figure 1 above, complete the following table to depict the two period pricing situation when Dr. Feelgood always plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Dr. Fine always chooses the "Low" price. Payoffs SECOND Period Payoffs TOTAL FIRST Period Payoffs Charges Charges (high or low) (high or low) Fine Fine Feelgood Feelgood d. Using the information in Question 4 and Figure 1 above, complete the following table to depict the two period pricing situation when Dr. Feelgood always chooses the "Low" price and Dr. Fine always chooses the "Low" price. FIRST Period Payoffs SECOND Period Payoffs TOTAL Payoffs Charges Charges (high or low) (high or low) Fine Fine Feelgood Feelgood e. Using the information in Question 4 and Figure 1 above, complete the following table to depict the two period pricing situation when Dr. Fine always plays "Tit-for-Tat" and Dr. Feelgood always chooses the "Low" price. Payoffs SECOND Period Payoffs TOTAL FIRST Period Payoffs Charges Charges (high or low) (high or low) Fine Fine Feelgood Feelgood

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