please help answering these, im so confused

Suppose that the market for sake is in equilibrium. A decrease in the price sushi-grade tuna, a complement in demand for sake, would cause the market equilibrium price to _and quantity to O A. increase; increase O B. increase; decrease O C. decrease; decrease O D. decrease; increase O E. The effect would be ambiguous. Clear my choiceQuantity Total Price Demanded Cost $147 0 $257.25 $132.3 $264.6 $117.6 N $279.3 $102.9 W $301.35 $88.2 4 $330.75 $73.5 5 $367.5 $58.8 6 $411.6 $44.1 J $463.05 $29.4 8 $521.85 $14.7 9 $588 The table above reports the demand and costs faced by a monopolist. If the government ruled that the monopolist has to charge a price equal to their marginal; cost, what would the monopolist do? O A. produce 5 units and earn zero profit. O B. produce 4 units and earn a profit of $22.05. O C. produce 7 units and earn a profit of $154.35. O D. Exit the market. O E. None of the other answers.Suppose that two restaurants, Fernando's Chicken and Ferdinand's Chicken, are in a dispute over the similar names of their restaurants. Both want the other restaurant to change their name to avoid customer confusion. They have consulted a third party who has proposed an agreement in which both would make slight changes to their names to make them less similar. If they agree, they will evenly split $225 per day in profits. Alternatively, either restaurant can file a lawsuit seeking to force the other to change their name. If only one takes this aggressive approach, the other will agree to change their name, and the one who keeps their original name will earn a larger share of the overall profits ($300 vs. $150). If both sue, they will enter mandatory arbitration, and the expected outcome is again that both will make slight changes in their name, but they will also incur lawyer and arbitration fees, leaving them with the equivalent of $75 per day in profits. Their profits in all possible scenarios is represented by the following pay-off matrix. (Ferdinand's payoffs are depicted in bold.) Ferdinand's Agree Sue Agree 225, 225 150, 300 Fernando's Sue 300, 150 75, 75 Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria? O A. (Agree, Agree) only O B. (Sue, Sue) only O C. Both (Agree, Agree) and (Sue, Sue) O D. Both (Agree, Sue) and (Sue, Agree) O E. None of these are Nash equilibria. 0 Clear my choiceConsider the following pay-off matrix for two players with two possible strategies. (Player B's payoffs and strategies are shown in bold.) Player B Action X Action Y Action X 34, 17 85, -17 Player A Action Y -17, 85 51, 68 Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria? O A. (X,X) only O B. (Y,Y) only O C. Both (X,X) and (Y,Y) O D. Both (X,Y) and (Y,X) O E. None of these are Nash equilibria. 0 Clear my choice