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in an exante moral hazard framework, assuming there are two are borrowers that are putting in effort c each, in a group-lending-with-joint-responsibility contract delivers a joint payoff of 2y 2R 2c when the two borrowers are putting effort, and if the two borrowers are not putting any effort and are both lucky, theirjoint payoff is p2(2y 2R) where y > 1 is the individual return from investing 1, R is the gross repayment per borrower accruing to the microfinance organization, p is the individual probability of being lucky when a borrower does not put any effort in her investment project and obtains y > 0. If she does not put any effort and is unlucky with probability 1 p , she obtains y = 0. We can then write clown an incentive compatibility constraint and obtain the maximum repayment R which the microfinance institution can charge. We will call this RFI = y C 1p3' "Repayment R will be different if in a joint responsibility contract where both borrowers do not put any effort, and one borrower is lucky but the other one is unlucky.\" Explain