Please help me analyze this case. Then, take lesson from it and link it to the way The Ordinary penetrates other countries (Vietnam, Thailand etc)

CASE 2-4 Ethics and Airbus One Serler her, a la qual, led by Jean-Claude Van Tspeti, a Belgian magistrals, raided Airbus's headquarters in Toulouse, "They wanted to check whether there was possible falsification of documents. bribery or other infractions as part of the sale of Air- bus aircraft to Saberia." says Van Espen's spokesman. The team 20 Belgian anal Tretch investigatii interviewed everal Airbus voployess during its brwday stay in Toulouse aud caried away boxes of documents In November 1997. Saberva had approved an order for 17 Airbus A320s (narrow-bodied aircraft), which it did not need. lisen more Tidly, it had doubled the under at the last time to 14. a move thal helpel Irizar llc airlin's collapse four years latvr. Although nominally controlled by the Belgian government. Sabena was run by the parent company of Swissuir, SAirGroup, which had nwned a sake of 49.5 procul since 1995 and which also won busu 2001. A lommer Sahuu muda, who arrival after The Airbus order was placed, says that the plocs were not nccdet "It was a fatal busi- ness decision." A Belgian parliamentary cominission's recent report Cimins that the Airbux order was a big chuxe of Saberia's collapse. Von Espan's scparald criminal investigation is coulidung According to the report. it started in October 2001 after l'hilippe Doyou. then a Sabena employec. lodged a omplaint - other things, he suegested to Van Ispen that he interview Peter Cysel, a funnet Swissait etrployce THEY Working at Airbus, who piil ligether Saba's dcal willi Airbus, Gyscl deniss any impropricly. Thic for mer Sabena manager says: "I never got the slightest whiff that the decision was driven by kickbacks, side payments, and so on. But 1 carinet rule anything out." Neither does Van Ispen. Toily airlities are ordering about 400 aircrall a year. But it yoox limes, Sud plans, worth around $60 billion. Nec sok a year. In the past 10 years, Airbus (originally a consortium, now owned 80 percent by PADS and 20 percent by BAT Systems) has caught us wilh Bacing, which had enjoyaul wch.hirds of the markel since ils 747 jumbo-jclcnlural commercial service in 1970. Many airscall arc no doubt. bought and sold in cntir-ly conven tional ways. But many are not. After all, lots of airlines are still LATINTII and mul subject to normal hliTION rules. Commis sion paymenis (licilor illicit) on mullimillion-dollar zirrall deals increase the capital cost of aircraft, which are therefore subject to higher depreciation or operating-Icasc charges. or both. But these extra costs are barely discernible in the pool of red ink created by the carriers' peretiil lesson. Aircrali purchases drag on for ycars, as airlincs play Bocing and Airbus off against each other. Especially in a buyer's market. deep discounts are common, performance guarantees are demanding, and manufacturers have to offer all sorts of sweeteners (e.c., air- CTH Tade-its, inasual Qaralos) to persuade un sitlile lo swilch In thcir aircraft. Unsurprisingly, given the regulated nature of international air travel.politics plays a part. For instatice. Tu soutier haul Ait Mauri- lius honghi in 1994 thn il nuvinal an upgrade Paris Orly In Charles de Gaullo airport, which is Air France's min base with better onward connections, Aircraft purchases have long been associated with controversy It the 1970x, when Lockheed was will making civil jels, it was sught bribing Japanese Ollicials to buy ils L1011 wide bodice airliner. A were prime minister was later charged and convicta in 1983 for liking a bribc. Prinvc Buruliard of ibc Nolhcrlands also was disgraced for his involvement with Lockheed. This scan- dalled in 1977 to Congress passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (RCTA), which forbids American companies, their officers. or Lheir representatives fruitro bribing forum officials. Critics onco byc pointed out ibal Amcrican firms van sidestep the FCPA by using foreign subsidiaries and nationals to pay bribes. Boeing says that its policy is to adhere to the spirit and letter of the FCPA. that its systems of controls ensure employees comply with this policy, atkllal no Buscing employce has been charged under FCPA. I 1982 Bocing picaded guilty to falsc slalcmals abou! commissions on the sale of cortimercial aircraft prior to 1977. Doe- iny also says that there have been public hearing in the Bahamas overalyxlions of bribery in the 1990 sale nf deHavilland aircraft Lo Bahamas Air, during Bncing's nwtiership ordicHavilland. Airbus bas not becul subject to such constraints. France ratitix an OTCD Convention to outlaw bribery of foreigri public officials in 2001. Until then the LOVETTITITI even perundle Trench com- nics lax deductions for viving bribes, For years, as they steadily lost market share to the European challenger, the Americans outspokenly critical of Airbus. In the 1980s the beer was the huge subsidies that uropean govern- ments pour litio lhe inklisty. Now thal Airbus tepays such lautich aid, it is less reci, specially as Bosiny roccives indirect subsi- dies through America's defense budget and space program. But the American government also has spoken out on the sub- ject of bribery. Grant Aldonas, an undersecretary for international Louils, Indontigressional communice: "Utilorlama lely This aircrall manuaclaring) is an industry where forcign corruption as a rul impact.. this sector has been especially vulnerable to trade distor- Lions involving bribery of foreign public officials." According in European Parliament report, published in 2001, America's National Security Agency (NSA) interoplou laxes and phone calls herwcco Airbus, Saudi Arabian Airlines, and the Saudi government in early 1994. The NSA found that Airbus agents were olering bribes to : Shui official to secure a lion's share on Aithila in modernizing Saudi Arabian Airlines' lowl, The plans were in a $6 billion deal that Edouard Balladur, France's then primo min- ister, had hoped to clinch on a visit to scc King Fahd in January 1994. Ile went home empty-handed. Jarries Wonley, the director of the Central Intelligence AOCTILY, rccouncd in a news article in 2000 bow thic American gov- ernment typically reacted to intelligence of this sort. "When we have caught you [uropeans) -.. we go to the government you're bribing and tell its officials that we don't take kindly to such corrup- Linn." he wrole. Apparently this (atkla direct sales pilch from Bill Cliton to King Fall) swung by aircrat. part of the dical Bocing's and McDonnell Douglas's way KUWAITI KICKBACKS? Not cren thc NSA, however, knows about verything in the aircraft- manufacturing industry as it actually happens. Consider the history of ani Aithus Inder placed by Kuwail Airways Corporatini (KAC). Apollier 513CW airlinc. CS2-12 GELIGE Casos 2 The Cultural Environment of Global Marketing CS2-13 In November 1995. Reuters reported that Kuwaiti prosecutors had questioned Dader Mallalah. KAC's the chief financial officer, er allegations of embezzlement made against him by KAC. The firm's chuir man, Ahmed 1 Mislari, had suspended Mallalaha from his job the previous month. But KAC had trumped up the allega- tions against Mallalah to put the lid on a story of corruption in which is then chairman was hitriself involved. The story hewani Octly Me years carlier in Cuito, where KAC hid scl up tcmporary licadquarters alicr raq's invasion of Kuwail in August 1990. Most of its planes would inevitably be lost or dam- aged, so al Mishari was planning a shiny new postwar fleet. Nat- urally, both Boeing and Airbus vere asked to tender. Both firms expulcd politics to play a parlin KAC's choice, specially aile all Amsrican-lod coalition had libcrated Kuwail. Shortly after the liberation of Kuwait, Boeing and KAC met in Luton. One persone preselil says al Mishari gave the impressioni thal ibc order would lx Boxing's. Aller all, unlil ibon, American companics bad won most of the large reconstruccion contracts from a grateful government. Airbus hoped otherwise. In 1991, shortly before the Paris Air Show, Tehn Pictwin, the then-turs of Aitbux. Total Misuri at the Churchill Hotel in London. The two talked in privalc for part of the time. so what they discussed is not known. lvo clear inferences. however, can be drawn from subsequent events: al Mishari prom- ised the order to Airbus, and Pierson pressed for an announcement al the trimite withouw. As substantial public fun:ls were involved, KAC was supposed to follow the formal process in Kuwait before placing the order. This process included approvals from the Ministry of Finance and the public-periding watchdog. None of these approvals was sought huluc Ihc air show. In June 1091, al. The show, al Mistari stica Kuwaiti ollicials and Bocing when lic announced a firm order for 15 Airbus aireratt, worth $1.1 billion, and options for nine more, worth up L. $900 million. A delighted Pierxomi Irurter the deal 35 Airbus's first single order for all ils aircraft. Tyncs. Most unusually, Bacing was tol skall lor ils "hcslxnd loal" offor, according to a former KAC cmployce. Boxing's response to the announcement was to offer generous discounts to KAC-so that ils package was around $100 million cheaper that is rivalstu il. *5 too late. The upslo, ofa nching in the summer of 1991 between the boss of Boeing Commercial, furious American otti- cials, and the Crown Prince of Kuwait was a messy compromise. KAC would order the engines for the Airbuses from General Llec- iric; Bixity would receive an order fuit two wide-boue platics ax a sop, and lic lirm order for 15 Airbus air call would go alicad provided that KAC bought from Boeing in the future. This compromise left al Mishari ini a rather awkward sput. KAC had an option to buy nine more aircraft from Airbus. An airline is usually able to walk away from an option cal if it for at the mindest deposit paid. But this casc was far from normal. The company that was to take up the option was not KAC itself but a subsidiary, Avia- tione crise and Tinhtice Company (ALARCO), which al Mixhari had set up in Bermuda in Suplember 1992. ALAFCO was to huy the aircraft xullaschem to KAC. In lalc 1992 al Mishri confirmed to Picrson that ALAFCO would buy thic ning plans and sent off a $2.5 million deposit. By buying the planes through ALARCO), al Mislari interided to bypass formal govertirietill upproval. Thiere was more to be deal. Airbus chuipped in a wlal of $450.000 between 1992 and 1994 to help with the costs of set- ting up and running ALAFCO. On December 15, 1992, ALARCO appointed a part-time commercial adviser. Mohamed llabib EL Fikih, a Tunisian national. Ilis day job was then as head of sales in the Middle East-for Airbus. Under his ALATCO contract of etploymrioril, a copy of which Tomislis and which was lol run for direc yours from January 1991, El Fekili reciwd $5.000 a month and $80,000 in back pay for services" rendered to ALAPCO from February 1. 1990_31 months before ALARCO's incorporationto December 31, 1992. The $5.000 was paid cach month fruti ALARCO's accountthur 201-901-114 at this Com mercial Bank of Kuwail in New York to El Fokin's personal account at Crdit Lyonnais's branch in Blaenac, France, where Airbus is bass on the outskirts of Toulouse. By 1993 three of the nine aircraft under option, all cargo planes, CTC Ticarly ready for delivery. However, Mallalah, who was also ALAFCO's chicf cxecutive, insisted that the transaction he subicct to formal procedure in Kuwait. This meant competitive teriders Irum Aithius au Bucing. Unsuprisingly, Airbus, with inside knowl cdxc from its two- bed vice president. El Fekih, was able in match cxacily ofers from Bocing, alicr Bociny came in over $501 million chcaper. With nothing to choose between the offers. ALAFCO selected Airbus, on the grounds that KAC's fleet now comprised predominantly Airbil sical. The deal siled brough KAC's hoard and the Ministry of Finance. Ilowever, Mallalah provided Kuwait's public spending watchdog with full details of ALAFCO's order for the cargo planes. It refused to sanction the deal. Consultants concluded in early 1995 Lhat the purchase of the cargo witcrall was mind justifical. The Mine istry of Finance lol) KAC DOL o proced. Anar Millalab submit red a report to KAC's board on the affair. El Fekih resigned from ALANCO in March 1995. Il Tekih says that he acted in an honest way: Pierson approved his ALATCO contract, as did the boards of KAC and ALAFCO: liis ALAFCO contract had nothing to do with the sale of Airhus to KAC, KAC canceled its option; ALAFCO never bought any Airbus hirutalt: tie acle as a consultatil lo help sel up ALANCO N ati aircral-tiuncing company and he declared his warnings to the lax nan. Airbus ways t.bal ll. oflcrs this sort of support to customers, when asked. The present owners of th: ALAFCO business confirm that ALAICO bought three Airbus aircraft Orihe other six aircrall unkler urin, Ihree were to COTT inlo firm orders. Two Airbus A32(Is wcrc lcasid 19 Shomuk Air in Egypt. This joint venture between KAC and EgyptAir was specifi- cally set up to find a home for them but is being liquidated becauso of massive losses, Kuwait's Ministry of Finance leased another. Al Mixhari, nacked as the chairman of KAC'in 1999 aftur stend- ing almosl. his vali'c career with the airlinc, owns a shopping com plex in the Salmiya district of Kuwait, which local wags have dubbed the "Airbus Centre.* Al Mishari, whose family is wealthy, suffered financial problems when the Kuwaiti stock market collapsed in the carly 1980s. Al Mishani litcs in comment, as dos KAC. It is not irrelevant to ask if the price of the Airhuis aircraft was inflated to allow for kickbacks. No evidence of graft has ever come Los light. However, to policeman, in Kuwail (or elsewhere), has looked for any INDIA INK What about cases where police have carried out investigations? In March 1090 Trulia's Coulul Bureau of Invesign Liut (CBT) lile a lirsinilutin Tepori (FIR). IL whs investigating allegations 11:41 Airbus bad hribed bighly plaval puhlic servals and oliers to induce Indian Airlines (IA) to order its aircraft. CALIGE CS2-14 Part 5 Supplementary Material the French government. The CBI told Wadchra, despite trying Interpol and diplomatic channels, it was not getting any help from the French government. The French embassy in Delhi in cilet Lold Windchra lycl. lost when he wrote lo ask why France was do cooperating Wadchra's case became topical because I's board approved an order for 43 Airbus planes, worth around $2 billion. The order now needs Vermeil approval. However, in September 2000), the Dellii court rulol na che Indian yoxcromat should not approve further purchases from Airbus until the CBI had obtained the infor mation it wanited from the French. The upshot of the 1A story is that no serious attempt has been made In csiahlish whether or nol Airbus paid kick hacks In Gandhi and associates. The CBI has not answered writico questions. In March 1986 state-owned I had ordered 19 Airbus A320s. Worth $952 million, with an option for 12 more later exercised. This item was ilexpleite facilihal, when I Nel up a committee it 1983 lo recommend replaccrcnla all for ils aginy Bociny licct, the A320 was not considered-it had not then been launched or flown. With approval from the Indian government. I had in July 1984 paid Boeing a deposit for 12 Boeing 757s, large narrow-bodied aitan. Scwral civils vans and IA officials wcrv umxl in lie FIR OLC name not on the list was that of Rajiv Gandhi, India's prime minister in 1984-89, who was killed in a burrb explosion in May 1991. How has the CBI's investigation progressed in the intervening yuars? Hardly an all, despile the founding on public-interest grounds of the CBI in Delhi's Iligh Court since 1998 by B. L. Wadcliri.au anticorruption lawyer based in Delhi. The towaniss has examined the publicly awhilable court CiTrietis-the CBI'xslali tesori ils investigation MIC srorom Wadchra's higation These papers allye, first, luat in October 1984, wecks before Gandhi, a formar pilot, succoded his mother, IA rcccived an offer from Airbus for A320 aircraft, a smaller and less experisive plane hun Briemy's 757. T requirol urgeil allenlit. Secund, in Novem- hur, 1.bc aviation ministry gave I just. Ihree days lo appraisc llic offer for Gandhi's offico. Much later in 1990, Indian Express, an Indian newspaper reported a leaked manuscript note that showed that Gandhi had iucillat a meeting on August 2. 1985. hul TA "should go in for Airbus A320 aircra." Gandhi's correspondence file on the deal mysteriously van- ished. The court papers show that civil servants reconstructed 29 pages of the missing file for the CBI by obtaining copy cotto spotkanice from government deperlictis. Remarkahly, this isk took seven years and cycn then the reconstruction was only partial. After the green light from Gandhi. approvals from IA and LOVETTITITIL bodies were a lummality. For instance, the 1A hourul approved thc Airbus ordur ala mccting on August 31, 1985, which started al boon. The quality of the analysis prescried to the houtal on the competing offers was pitiful. The board considered only one criterion-comparative fuel efficiency. Ixen for that, the data were incomplele. The A320 with the origine choseti hy IA had yet to be Tricd rud cslcd anywhere provisional dala only wors in luced in the report for Boeing 737s since no technical data were supplied by the company." But Boeing had not been asked for any because two hours before the board meeting. HL 9:50 ... TA's managing director, who is amx in th: FIR as an alleged recipicut ol kicklycks. rcccived: letter from Richard Elliott. then Boeing's regional sales director Bueing offered to supply up to 35 of its 737 aircraft, its natrostal- ied rival to the A320, with a discount of $5 millioni per plane. This nffer would rulucu TA's mostmcil in tow plancs hy $140 million, stated Elliott, L's board brushed thic oflcr aside on the grounds that "if Boeing was sic too serious they sic could have made The offer earlier." The Delhi cousi. las : wilhering opinion of the help Airhuis bas given the CBI. It allowed Wadehru lo acl Airbus's Indian suhsil- iary to his action on the grounds that Airbtis in France was not cooperating Airbus told Wadehra that Crench lass forbude it from answering his questions. Althussells its aircrallon i helt tetik," lliclum insisted The court has castigated the CBI for its dilatory approach. It took the Indian authorities until 1995 to contact Airbus for infor- mation, only to be told that such requests should be routed through MOUNTIES AND BANKS Bullbonic police forces that have shown taller more resolve and initiative than the CBI. One important case establishes that Airbus has paid "cortirmissions to individuals hiding behind shell compa- miex iti juristiction where werslip of complex is nola Taller of public record, and whicre suriet bank sccrccy applics. Airbus's first big sale in North America was a $1.5 bilion deal, signed in 1988. to sell 34 aircraft to the then state-owned Air Can- ada. The middleman was Karlheinz Schreiber, a German-Canadian with comeclits to puliticians in Cierny rud Chtit. Sehirciher cmcrgcd as a ligure in the financing sandal thil voyullad Germa- ray's Christian Democrat party and its top politician. llelmut Kohl, a former chaticellur, in the late 1990%. In August 1999 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, acting on a German arrest warrmut.tabhul Schircilor. In 2000. Schreiber was charged in Germany with tax cvasion ou moncylic had rcccived for the Airbus transaction and other deals. The Sdlieviche Zeitung, a German claily, supplied a copy of Schreiber's itidiclmrenillo Tire Econoauit. According to this document, Airhus siynol a consul- Lancy contact (amended four timcs) with Inlerntional Aircraft Lcasing (AL) in March 1985. IAL. which was to help with the Air Canada deal, was a shell company based in Vaduz, Liechtenstein, and a subsidiary of attier lichenstein-registered shell. KeTISITIN- von Anstall. According to the indictment, between September 30, 1988, and October 21, 1993 (i.e. as Air Canada took delivery of Airbus planes). Airbus paid a total of $22.540,000 in "commissions" tu TAL. TheTi $10.867.100 was paid in TAT's accoutil at the Verwal- LUDUS Wd Prival-Bank in Vaduzan: $11,673,000 iDLO IAL'S ACCOW rimber at Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) in Zurich. During extra- dition proceedings against Schreiber in 1999, Airbus admitted to these payments. In October 2000, Schreiber won a suspension of cxccution of his casc. The court ruled that LAL belonged to Schreibw. and also that, to the extent that Schreiber had paid out the Airbus "commissions x Schmierwelder (tease money), these payments coulil he lux deduciblc. Scbrciber's German lax lawyer liter told the courl: Schmiergelder wronoloxnly paid to 1.bc 'creased person by Air- bus]. It was through third persons to make reception anonymous and the Schwieriger unrecognizable as such. So w gol The Cutritrixstoux? Aller years of police investi- Linds in last five jurisdictions, il is still nou clear. Anvording in The Last Antigo a well-researched book on the affair by llarvey Cashore and Stevie Cameron. both Canadian journalists, a lot was withurai in cash. Cashore, a producer on the rich scare, the GEPIGE Cascs 2 The Cultural Environment of Global Marketing CS2-15 No one doubts the company's ability to compctc across the whole product range with Boeing By the time the Paris Air Showis over, Aithius will probably he well ahead of its rival in market share. thanks to an alractive ring of planes, Bul if charges of corruption involving Airbus were to emerge from Van Espen's investigation of Sabena, that would deal the company's reputation a severo blow Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's main investigative program. says that Schreiber's bank records and diaries showed that he USLI- ally flowed a simple forma lor dividing up the money bulilor Canadians and ball for Europeans. The book alleges that there may have been a smaller scam within the bigger scam: An Airbus employeo may have got some of the money. Some of the money was transferred into subaccounts al SBC in Zurich. One of the subaccounts, coderated Slewari- vss." rcccived as much as ou cigh ili oilic commissions. The book sueeests that this account was intended for Stuart Iddles. Airbus's setior vice president from 1986 to 1994. Idules's wife bought Casa Las stacas, a luxurious beachfront villa in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, 111 Scplemnhet 1992. Documents in The Economist's possession show the price was $1.5 million. According to a person involved in the deal, the money was wired from an account in the time of the Ciclon Torundalioti at the Zurich branch of Lloyds, British bank. Mrs. Idules confirms thal slic hought the villa in 1902 bul says she has an Ihc "logeissu idca how much it cost, or which lank the moucy camc from. Mr. Iddles has denied any impropriety. Airbus says it has not been indicted in atly jurisdiction over the Air Canada deal, or et aniy nilier sales. Ilaces thal.no investigator has found uncl.bical keluvior ou ils par. SYRIAN SCANDALS Only TIC CAND O Airbus's colchig with a miklumat apparently 10 lyriloc officials To Isuy ils xircraft bas led lo convictions. Accor- ing to Syria's state news agency, three people were sentenced in Syria in Octuber 2001 to 12 years' imprisonment each (later reduced to 10 years) for "serious irregularities" in connection with stalc-ntial Syrianuit's nder for six Airbus A320 in 1096. The court also imposed a finc on the three of $268 million. They were a former minister for economic affairs, a former transport ininister, and Mutir Abu Khaklit, the milletinan. Khuduur was setileticeul in abscnlis and is reportedly living in Spain. The couri found thal thic men bad force the airlino lo huy hc plancs, worlh $2401 mil- lion, and as a result Syrianair had incurred "big financial losses." The only inferences to be drawn are either that there was a mis- carriage of justice vt that bribes were puid. If the fallet, the new 19ency did nol release selails of how much the men cohczzled, Quite why bribes would have been necessary is puzzling. Because America deems Syria to be a sponsor of terrorism, Bocing has long been prohibited from exporting there. The Syrian government leclities to comment. Thic rusull of investigations discussed at the beginning of the case into instances of corruption or alleged corruption by Airbus suggests that Van Tispen will have a very long haul as he tries to establish whether "commissions" influenced Sabena's decision to huy Airhuses. The cer for the 34 A320s could he views on- pxlcnce. But nobody can predict thic results of Van Espcn's inquiry. The parliamentary report says Sabena's board received some lacuniary information that was trisleading. The choice of Airbus supposcilly mcanl Sabena was confident of strong sales growib. Yol a month alcr the order was placed, SAirGroup's chicl cxccutive, who also sat on Sabena's board, said: "Were now in the last year or years of the boom in air travel." (We do not mean to imply by itilerotice that the chief executive wax COTTULL) Most of what is recounted in this case baprcox before Airbus's present top management team arrived, before it was established as a proper company, and before France adopted the OECD conven- tion on bribery: AIRBUS LOBBIES TO RELAX ANTI-BRIBERY RULES Rulchsaulaincurrents have revealed luw companies sct their lobhying power to loosen official rules designed to stop corruption. In lyhind- thoscones movies, Rolls Royce BAE Systems, and the aircraft giant Airbus persuaded then trade secretary Patricia lletvitt to allow ther lo keep secret delails of the midlernet twed to secure itileria Lional contracts. Slic brushed aside the advice of U.K. government officials who argued that these middlemen are often used to channel bribes to foreign politicians and officials to sin contracts. The government's Txpul Crails Gintatilee Department ITCGD) haul proposed that cxporlers had to disclose the identities of miklumn when buy applied for financial support from the taxpayer. The government required the details as part of tougher measures to stop the par- meni of bribes Woros hy Brilish companies. The ASCIITISTII were released by the ECGD following u rece dom of information requesi. [rom The Guardian (a Brilisli ocwspa per) and a recent court case. Minutes of a meeting on August 9, 2004, show that the three companies told the DCGD that informa- Lint about these middlemcn was very commercially Scrisitive." Thu minutcs continued: "Ilc dctwork of agcnls'intermediarics was a valuable assul built up over a number of ycars and of cred impar tarit commercial advantages such as being able to open door's.... The intermediaries therisches may have valid and justifiable re- Sons for waniling lori Donymous." The companics claimed that the names of the agents would leak from the LXCGD enabling competitors to poach them. Ilewitt agreed that the companies did not have to give the names or addresses of Lhoxe midlerti. Trovitel the 'irrix gave ati explariation. The companivs wanted "confirmuon liial. commercial couli dentiality would be accepted as a valid reason for not identifying its agents." Hewitt was forced to rethink the anti-bribery rules because ora legal victory by cortirLion CATIIMI TITX, IIS CONTI HO youn Sisun Hawley, Cor the yteus, suiz: "Kwhy who is the middle man is crucial in slopping corruption, olbcrwisy bc laxpayer will cuc! up directly supporting bribery." BAE was alleged to have made cor- rupt payments through middlernen in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and India, Rolls-Royce is accused nisxaying C15 tollion to win a contract in Tricha, TILO 2018 update: Delta. the world's largest carrice, chosc thc Airbus AI31 over Bociny's West 737 model, the Max 10. for no order of 100 planes for delivery starting in 2020. In an effort to battle Air- bus global growth, Brazil's Tobrnet and Bueitig begati patinership Lalks, hul hc Brazilian Rederal government was wary of any deal that would infringe on "national sovereignty." QUESTIONS 1. In each of the cases described, who benefits and who suf- fers from the alleged ethical and legal lapscs of Airbus! 2. How should the public relations staff at Airbus respond to the articles ampearing in Tire Fromanist, The Guardian, and Keulers News GELIGE