Please help me answer this question step by step, thanks so much.

3. Consider the data on the change in welfare for each voter for each policy that is contained in the table below. Note, (~a~b~ c~ d ~e) means that none of the policies are chosen. Policy a d e ~a~ b~c~dve ) -2 + 5 Voter -2 -2 + 5 D -2 -2 (a) Could policies a, b, c, d, and e pass individually using majority rule, i.e., absent log- rolling? Explain. Could the policy (abc), which combines a, b, and c into a single bill, pass by simple majority rule? Is this log-rolling? Explain. (b) Suppose voter D offers an amendment to policy (abc) to add policy d so the amended bill would be (abcd). Would the amendment pass? Explain. (c) How does a supermajority rule, requiring at least four of five voters to support a bill, affect voting on changes to the status quo (~ a ~ b~ c~ d ~ e)? Does this increase welfare? (d) Show that these individual preferences result in intransitive social preferences: ( abc ~ d ~ e) PG( ~ a ~ b ~ c ~ d ~ e) PG(~ a ~ bc ~ d ~ e) PG(~ abc ~ d ~ e) PG(abc ~ d ~ e), where (abc ~ d ~ e) PG(~a~ b~ c~ d ~ e) means the group prefers (abc ~ d ~ e) to (~a~b~c~d~e). Which voters are in the "winning coalition" on each pairwise vote? (e) Suppose only voter C can propose amendments. Show how voter C can get bill (~ a ~ be ~ d ~ e) passed by a sequence of votes using the motions and amendments given in 2 part (d), and taking the status quo as (~a~ b~ c~ d ~ e). How many amendments are required for C to get her preferred outcome under sincere voting' (f) Suppose you are voter B, if you choose to vote insincerely (i.e., you vote for a motion you would actually prefer not to pass, or visa versa), is there any way you could disrupt the agenda proposed by voter C in part (e) above? Explain, by showing which vote you would vote insincerely on, given everyone else votes sincerely, and show the outcome