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In Fruitland, strawberries are sold in 4-litre baskets to customers on a "pick-your-own" basis. There are 2 farmers who sell strawberries: Mickey and Kit. There are no costs of supplying strawberries for sale for either farmer, so each has MC = ATC = 0. Profit therefore is simply TR. Market demand for strawberries is given in the accompanying table. A scenario involving these farmers and some analysis is given below. Illustrate this scenario's Nash equilibrium as a prisoner's dilemma matrix. Click here to view market demand for strawberries. Click here to view the scenario and some analysis. Market demand for strawberries Q Mickey's Decision 30 60 $ 90 A. (75 Baskets, 75 Baskets) (75 Baskets, 105 Baskets) 14.50 13.75 12.50 11.50 10.50 8.50 6.50 5.00 Kit's Decision TR 435.00 825.00 1125.00 1380.00 1575.00 1530.00 1365.00 1200.00 120 150 (105 Baskets, 75 Baskets) (105 Baskets, 105 Baskets) 180 210 Mickey's Decision 75 Baskets 105 Baskets 240 B. 75 Baskets $ $ ($ $ Kit's Decision 105 Baskets $ $ ($ $ Scenario and analysis Which cell(s) of the prisoner's dilemma matrix for this scenario is a Nash equilibrium for this scenario? Select all tha A. The bottom right cell B. The bottom left cell C. The top left cell D. The top right cell E. There is no Nash equilibrium. If the market were served by a monopolist, the quantity traded would be 150 baskets, the price per 4-litre basket would be $10.50, and the profit for the firm would be $1575.00. If Mickey and Kit decided to collude, each would have an individual quantity supplied of 75 baskets and each would have profits of $787.50. Suppose Mickey and Kit agree to split the monopoly outcome. Kit, acting in her own self-interest, realizes that she can cheat and supply 105 baskets, when she does, Kit's profits are $892.50 and Mickey's profits are $637.50. Mickey decides to retaliate and increases his supply to 105 baskets, too, when he does, Kit's profits are $682.50 and Mickey's profits are $682.50. Neither farmer will cheat again and increase their output. Illustrate this scenario's Nash equilibrium as a prisoner's dilemma matrix. Next