Please help me solve the three parts with an explanation

Consider a game representation with the following normal form: Player 2 b C d e 2. 1 4,2 1,0 10, 3 2.4 B 6. 10 2. 20 0. 10 7. 15 0, 18 Player 1 C 5,0 0,0 3, 3 5.0 0, 1 D 8, 1 2, 4 0,0 5.1 4, 2 E 1,3 2, 6 0, 4 8,5 1,3 1. What is the payoff for Player 1 when she plays C and Player 2 plays e? 2. Does any player has a strictly dominant strategy? If so, what are they? 3. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game