Please help me to answer the questions as the following:

You must use the materials that I upload to support the answers (bring theory to support the answers)

Research and Theory

Below appears a number of views as to the nature of and the objectives of accounting theory.You are to construct a two to three page report, after reviewing a selection of the articles provided, for a potential new doctoral student, Clarly Uncertainwho is seeking to identify a theoretical foundation for his/her studies.Being a little (lot) lazy the student Clarly has agreed to pay you $350.00 for the report which has been requested by Clarly's potential supervisors as a part of the process of determining whether Clarly is potentially able to and capable of undertaking study at doctoral level.The student's topic is:

'A comedy of errors - accounting theory is fundamentally unable to assist in exploring accounting practice, enhancing our understanding or exploring a future for accounting practice in a brave new era of integrated reporting'

Requires:

1.Your report will advise this student about possible theoretical approaches that might be adopted and the questions you envisage such a student might ask to explore the topic area of choice.It will be written in a way that it appears that the report is written by and coming from Clarly. (550 wds)

2.In half a page indicate whether you think Carly's actions are ethically justifiable.Is this a wise approach to gain entry to a program? (250 wds)

The failure of accounting research to improve accounting practice: a problem of theory and lack of communication Eno L. Inangaa,, Wm Bruce Schneiderb a Maastricht School of Management and University of Ibadan, Endepolsdomein 150, 6229 EP Maastricht, The Netherlands b California State University, Los Angeles, CA, USA Received 22 May 2001; received in revised form 16 December 2001, 14 January 2002 and 9 February 2003; accepted 10 February 2003 Abstract There is anecdotal evidence to support the assertion that accounting research, or what is alleged to be research, is of little or no value to the practice of accounting, nor to the development of accounting as an academic discipline. The problem is not that efforts have not been made to conduct research, but rather there is a fundamental aw in the accounting research process itself. Tricker suggests that the research process can be understood using two models. One is a set of relationships which \"feed-forward\". That is, a known theory suggests a hypothesis, which is tested through the accumulation of data. If the hypothesis is proven to be true, it is added to the body of knowledge, enhancing the legitimacy of the underlying theory. The second model is intended to provide \"feed-back\". That is, the real world is observed and a model of it is proposed, based on known theory. Data is collected and processed, and the model is rened. When the model is consistent with the real world and known theory, it is added to the body of knowledge. These research models depend on the existence of known theory for their usefulness. The central problem of accounting research is that there is no known theory to use as a reference for creating hypotheses or models to be empirically researched. The absence of theory can be seen in education, practice, and the research literature itself. Practitioners, for example, because of their training and lack of experience with and interest in research tend not to look to research ndings to meet their professional needs.Accountingresearchers,ontheotherhand,havecreatedwhatappearsto be a highly advanced research context which, in effect, is an environment dominated by sophisticated methodology, rather than theory. The research basically emulates the hard sciences, which makes its pursuit academically acceptable, but it lacks substance. This explains the failure of accounting research to improve accounting practice. 1. Introduction The report of the American Institute of Certied Public Accountants' (AICPA') Special Committee on Financial Reporting (Jenkin's Committee) entitled Improving Financial ReportingA Customer Focus (AICPA, 1994) provided the rst empirical evidence that nancial reporting was not effectively meeting user needs. Some of the problems are rooted in the failure of nancial accounting to remain relevant. We assert that there has been an in adequate investment in substantive, appropriately-focused and structured research to identify the continuing and emerging needs of users of accounting information and to develop \"products\" to meet those needs. 2. Basic premises and structure of the paper Our rst premise is that most, if not all, of what purports to be research in accounting is, in fact, a trivial pursuit. We will demonstrate that accounting is not a science and that the mere use of scientic methodologies does not change the basic facts. We also contend that the reported research is nothing more than correlation analysis, rather than the testing of theories and related hypotheses. Moreover, the \"decision usefulness theory of accounting\" (Staubus, 2000) is no more than a rationalisation of observed activities. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) provides a normative implementation structure and set of regulations consistent with the assumptions and presumptions of the \"decision usefulness\" theory. We contend that the assumptions inherent in that theory have not been researched. Thus, without appropriate theory, accounting cannot be the subject of scientic research because, as a discipline, it lacks a basic requirement of a science. Researchers are thus unable to raise and research fundamental, non-trivial questions. The second basic premise is that accounting research is not signicantly linked to accounting practice because the issues and methods of interest to academic researchers are of little or no consequence to practitioners and, moreover, are not focused on fundamental questions. Additionally, it is important to note that in the university, at the undergraduate level, the \"educational\" process and curricula are based on a strong bias towards training for practice, rather than on education and the development of an appreciation for research. At the graduate level, the bias is towards pseudo-scientic research constrained by GAAP, resulting in the failure to discover new knowledge and develop relevant products to serve user needs. Several highly respected members of the academic community have addressed these issues (Albrecht and Sack, 2000; Demski, 2001; Selto and Widener, 2001). In the following sections of the paper,we will develop our argument and recommendations based on a discussion of: The nature of research Theoryan essential ingredient of research The historic role of research in accounting education and practice The causes for the failure of accounting research Accounting research: re-conceptualisation and re-modelling In the Section 7, we will suggest two models intended to provoke thinking about new directions and possibilities for research and its relationship with accounting education, training and practice. We will then conclude with a brief reection on the current situation and the importance of research as a social activity. 3. The nature of research According to one of the authors, research may be dened as a theory-based systematic investigation of, or enquiry into, a specic phenomenon for the purpose of discovering new facts or critical exposition of existing knowledge. The ndings that emerge are normally expected to contribute to knowledge and bring about positive change (Inanga, 1998). Ijiri (1975) identied three attributes which research ndings must have before they can contribute to knowledge in this manner. The rst is novelty, to distinguish creative activities essential to research from production activities. For example, while production activities can be subjected to a routine, creative activities are full of uncertainties, and often require unconventional approaches. Thus, research involving the replication of an experiment is generally valued much less than the original experiment, because the outcome of such replication tends to add much less to knowledge than the original experiment. Furthermore, the repeated experiment could follow procedures that may have been programmed by the original effort. For example, since the rst successful human heart transplant by the late Christian Barnard, a South African surgeon, subsequent successful similar transplants have not received as much publicity as the rst. The same is true of the successful cloning of a sheep, Dolly, by two Scottish scientists. As Polanyi (1964) observed, no solution of a problem can be accredited as a discovery, if it is achieved by a procedure following denite rules. It has been suggested that, while the cloning of Dolly is novel and constitutes a signicant research breakthrough, the vast majority of research is, at best, a marginal increment to existing knowledge. Just how large an increment needs to be in order to constitute a worthwhile and novel piece of research is debatable. Thus, two highly-skilled researchers may take very different views of the same research due to either personal biases or current research climate. Research ndings are also expected to be defensible, either through logical proofs or empirical verication. This attribute, according to Ijiri, makes it possible for the ndings to be reproduced and veried by other researchers. Reproduction and verication make research ndings usable by anyone, independently of the original researchers. Research ndings are thus distinguished from personal opinions, which cannot be evaluated without references to those expressing the opinions. It has however been suggested that, in reality, studies may be difcult to replicate due to lack of data access, proprietary rights to databases, and lack of incentive to replicate studies, especially as few journals publish replications. Many researchers invest valuable hours and much money in developing their extensive database in a given area; such researchers may see the database as a comparative advantage and be very reluctant to share their database with others. A more fundamental problem in accounting is the inability of subsequent researchers to develop new accounting data comparable to that in the original study. Therefore, it may be impossible to independently corroborate the ndings and conclusions originally reported. There are, therefore, constraints to defensibility of research ndings on the basis of their potential for reproduction by other researchers for independent verication. The third characteristic of research ndings is availability through dissemination. Research ndings that are not or cannot be disseminated cannot contribute to knowledge. No matter how important the discovery may be, it will not inuence and benet knowledge, if the researcher locks up the ndings or is systematically prevented from reporting them. Research ndings must therefore, be disseminated. Both the researchers and those who control the reporting context (i.e. journal editors and reviewers), must be adequately motivated to make the results known as widely as possible. As will be discussed later, there could be problems where researchers, and journal editors and reviewers (i.e. the gate keepers of research dissemination), have different perceptions about the importance of research ndings (Demski, 2001). 4. Theoryan essential ingredient of research The above characteristics of research ndings suggest that research is a theory-based social activity in which observed phenomena are tested with reference to known theory, or a theory is tested with reference to observed phenomena. The results, whatever they are, contribute to knowledge. The contribution, however, may or may not be signicant. We assert, therefore, that theory is an essential element in research. It provides \"a set of interrelated constructs...denitions, and propositions, that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena\". Kerlinger (1964, p. 1). The purpose of research as a theory-based social activity is to create and document knowledge of relationships and phenomena. Research is then designed and intended to use theory as a reference for the investigation. In general there are two types of theorypositive and normative. Positive theories attempt to describe real world situations as they are. Research based on positive theories involves empirical observations of the relevant phenomena from which a problem is dened. Data relevant to the problem are then collected and hypotheses formulated and tested by independent process. If the theory that results is an accurate representation (description) of the empirical phenomena, such a theory can be used for predictive purposes. Induction follows empirical observation and takes the form: \"If event Y takes place, then the outcome will be Z\". The greater the number of empirical observations, the better supported the related induction will be. A normative theory is a goal-oriented theory that represents real world situations, not as they are, but as they should be. It is prescriptive rather than descriptive theory that explains,and sets out, principles of what ought to be.Normative theories a recharacterised by goal assumptions and deduction. Each type of theory has its strengths and weaknesses. Positive theories can take various descriptive forms. One form is the verication of the accuracy of its representation through logical deduction. Another is appraisal of the extent to which observations agree with deductions. Checking the size and selection method of observations and the induction process itself is yet another form of defence of descriptive theory. A major strength of positive theory is its predictive ability. It also enables hypotheses to be tested against observations. But if the observations are biased there can be prediction errors. Furthermore, if the observations are partial or relate to samples with characteristics unrelated to the population, it will be difcult to generalise conclusions from ndings. The strength of normative theories is their feasibility. It must be convincingly demonstrated that a specic event should take place, if a specied goal is to be attained. The inductive process of descriptive theory and the deductive process of normative theory are interrelated in that the deductive process may also be applied to empirical observations, if reality is to be changed to a more preferred state as indicated by the assumed goals (Ijiri, 1975). As argued by Ijiri, a normative theory need not be counterempirical. This is particularly so where the existing system is optimal. The outcome would be a convergence of positive and normative theories. The goals on which normative theory is based need not be actual. The researcher need not accept or subscribe to these goals. But since the goals may depend on personal judgements, the researcher may nd it difcult to exclude personal biases. Attainment of the assumed goals may be difcult where they are ambiguous or lack detailed operational specications. Some qualitative researchers in the social sciences have advocated a \"grounded theory\" approach as alternative to positive and normative approaches. Miles and Huberman (1991) and Patton (1990), are among these advocates. Straus and Corbin (1990, p. 23) dene grounded theory as one \"derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents\". It thus has some elements similar to positive approach. However, instead of starting with a theory and then proving it, grounded approach \"begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge\" (ibid.). Conceptually, grounded theory is a technique for building theory based on observed social science phenomenon, using data derived from the research activity. Cynically, it is based on the idea of data in search of a rationalisation. It would be difcult to establish, convincingly, the superiority of a grounded approach to either positive or normative approaches. For example, the determination of relevance in a study phenomenon would still be a matter of personal judgment and subject to personal bias. The existing \"decision usefulness\" theory of accounting which underlies the Concept Statement of the Financial Accounting Standard's Board (FASB) and, therefore, US GAAP, is a classic example (see Staubus, 2000). Indeed, since the 1960s, accounting research has increasingly moved away from normative(e.g.Chambers,1966)topositive(e.g.WattsandZimmerman,1986).Thisdevelopment has been attributed to the introduction of large-scale empirical studies utilising economics and nance concepts (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) to analyse the behaviour of capital markets (Sharpe, 1964), and which led to the development of efcient market hypothesis with signicant impact on accounting research. Subsequent studies, such as Ball and Brown (1968) produced ndings that were inconsistent with the prescriptions of normative accounting researchers (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 4.1. Tricker's research models Two accounting research models presumably intended to achieve the above purpose, that is, research as a theory-based social activity, were suggested by Tricker (1978). The rst, shown in Fig. 1, is the classical model that Tricker labels a \"feed-forward\" model. Starting from known theory,there searcher formulates a new hypothesis and collects facts to test the hypothesis. If the hypothesis is false, the researcher reformulates the hypothesis. If the hypothesis is proven to be true, then a new theory emerges and adds to the body of knowledge. 4.2. Problems with theory in accounting research The role of theory as an essential ingredient of any research was discussed in the Section 4.1. Its centrality in accounting research is further emphasised in Tricker's models, both based on \"known theory\Theories for theorists or theories for practice? Liberating academic accounting research? Introduction The work which Humphrey and Scapens quote at the beginning of their paper was published ten years ago. This work (Hopwood, 1983; Hopper and Powell, 1985) called for detailed explanatory case studies of accounting in action. This call was answered, and the 1980s onwards has constituted what could well be termed an \"empirical revolution\" (Mattessich, 1995, p. 261). This empirical work challenged the prevalence of the normative theory which had dominated academic accounting up to the 1970s (Scapens, 1990). Where these empirics were informed by interpretive or critical theories, this work also portrayed the partial nature of accounting - indicating its \"embeddedness\" (Granovetter, 1985, pp. 481 ff.) in managerialist thinking and practice. The \"alliance\" between accounting and managerialism was also held responsible for privileging certain interests over others - as those of capital over labour (see, for example, Armstrong, 1987) or of realizing certain programmatic discourses to the exclusion of others - notions of economic efficiency driving out concepts of the public interest (see, for example, McSweeney, 1994). But this focus on empirics as \"what is happening\" has excluded work on \"what might happen\" or \"what should happen\". Consequently, there has been little reflective or critical work: (1) in exploring how far the links between accounting and managerialism are contingent rather than necessary; (2) in redefining accountable management to enable effectiveness rather than to serve cost efficiency alone; and (3) in linking accounting with the public interest rather than assuming that accounting must always promote private gain. This commentary argues that interpretive and critical accounting researchers should now reconnect with accounting as a practice and be prepared to present theories for practice rather than restricting their research to theories about practice. This would entail a re-engagement with normative issues as \"...accounting as a practice... is, above all, an attempt to intervene, to act upon individuals, entities and processes to transform them and to achieve specific ends\" (Miller, 1994, p. 1). Researching theories for practice would acknowledge normative issues - in the sense that all theoretical development would be seen as having potential ethical implications. In contrast, the normative theory which prevailed pre-1970 prescribed \"better\" accountings within a managerialist context - the ethical implications of which remained unexplored. In prescribing theories for practice, this commentary concurs with much of what Humphrey and Scapens write about promoting eclecticism in theory; the argument that a single totalizing theoretical perspective must fail to encompass the whole of reality is well taken (Thompson, 1993). But this commentary does take issue with some of the points they make about the nature of theory - as it is argued that theory as image or representation of the world detracts from the possibility of using theory as (re)presentation or in order to differentiate the world. Theory: mirror or map? Theories for practice would place more emphasis on theory as \"...a map or recipe or instructions manual which provides means by which we can do things in the world or cope with events\" (Sayer, 1992, p. 59) and less emphasis on theory as speculation about the world or contemplation of the world (compare with Humphrey and Scapens quoting Bishop, p. 10). Theories as \"maps\" would be alert to two areas neglected by the relativist school of thought with which the authors associate themselves (p. 11). First, \"mapping\" theories would delineate those real-world structures which define and constrain human agency and, second, they would \"point the way\" on new directions which arise from \"conditions of possibility\" in the world. On the first of these - \"real-world structures\" - the authors are equivocal; on page 94 they state that \"While there are a number of different theoretical schools within the \"alternative\" accounting literature, they would appear to share a general rejection of a realist ontology [emphasis added]. Accounting is seen as socially constructed, and not independent of the organizational, social and political actors (i.e. the axioms set out above would probably be widely acceptable)\". \"Realities are multiple, constructed and holistic\" is the first of the \"axioms\" from Lincoln and Guba (1985) with which Humphrey and Scapens associate themselves. But there is a crucial difference between the understanding that we cannot get \"outside\" our language or knowledge of things in order to compare our knowledge with those things (a position which is compatible with realism) and the belief that the world does not exist independently of our understanding of it (the position which Humphrey and Scapens appear to endorse in rejecting realism). Only those social phenomena which are conceptdependent (Sayer, 1992, pp. 29 ff.) can be said to be socially constructed in the sense that what these phenomena are depends wholly on what they mean to social actors. For example, in the sentence \"Accounting is a legitimating institution\