Please help me to compose a critical summary of the essay: "On Racist Speech" by Charles R. Lawrence III. In a critical summary, you are relating the argument, but along the way adding your opinion and perspective, commenting on the quality of evidence, pointing out where the argument succeeds and fails, and asking further questions.

Use moves in the following list to guide your summary, and refer to the Visual Guide: Writing a Critical Summary on page 61(the screenshot is below). You can combine some of these moves into one sentence, reorder information, provide quotations, and being problematizing at any point by inserting your position through careful use of words and phrases, adding an evaluative sentence of your own, or providing commentary or a paraphrase the essay.

Introduce: Provide the author and title and contextualize the information

Explain: Identify and describe the thesis and argument

Exemplify: Provide some of the author's original evidence

Problematize: Prose critical questions or provide an evaluation of the argument

Extend: Ask further questions or apply, test, or consider the argument in ways that support your evaluation of it.

(I also upload the example below, the first 5 screenshots are examples of Jacob article's critical summary, and the rest is the Charles Lawrence article.)

A SHORT ESSAY FOR SUMMARIZING PRACTICE The following piece by Susan Jacoby is annotated to provide a \"rough summary\" in the margins, more or less paragraph by paragraph the kind you might make if you are outlining an essay or argument. SUSAN JACOBY Susan Jacoby, a journalist since the age of seventeen, is well known for her feminist writings. \"A First Amendment Junkie\" (our title) appeared in the Hers column in the New York Times in 1978. Notice that her argument zigs and zags, not because Jacoby is careless but because in building a strong case to support her point of view, she must consider some widely held views that she does not accept; she must set these forth and then give her reasons for rejecting them. A First Amendment Junkie It is no news that many women are defecting from the ranks of civil libertarians on the issue of obscenity. The conviction of Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler magazine before his metamorphosis into a born-again Christian was greeted with unabashed feminist approval. Harry Reems, the unknown actor who was convicted by a Memphis jury for conspiring to distribute the movie Deep Throat, has carried on his legal battles with almost no support from women who ordinarily regard themselves as supporters of the First Amendment. Feminist writers and scholars have even discussed the possibility of making common cause against pornography with adversaries of the women's movement including opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment and \"right-to-life\" forces. [1] [1] Paragraph 1: Although feminists usually support the First Amendment, when it comes to pornography many feminists take the position of opposing the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, and other causes of the women's movement. All of this is deeply disturbing to a woman writer who believes, as I always have and still do, in an absolute interpretation of the First Amendment. Nothing in Larry Flynt's garbage convinces me that the late Justice Hugo L. Black was wrong in his opinion that \"the Federal Government is without any power whatsoever under the Constitution to put any type of burden on free speech and expression of ideas of any kind (as distinguished from conduct).\" Many women I like and respect tell me I am wrong; I cannot remember having become involved in so many heated discussions of a public issue since the end of the Vietnam War. A feminist writer described my views as those of a \"First Amendment junkie.\" [2] [2] Paragraph 2: Larry Flynt produces garbage, but Jacoby thinks his conviction represents an unconstitutional limitation of freedom of speech. Many feminist arguments for controls on pornography carry the implicit conviction that porn books, magazines, and movies pose a greater threat to women than similarly repulsive exercises of free speech pose to other offended groups. This conviction has, of course, been shared by everyone regardless of race, creed, or sex who has ever argued in favor of abridging the First Amendment. It is the argument used by some Jews who have withdrawn their support from the American Civil Liberties Union because it has defended the right of American Nazis to march through a community inhabited by survivors of Hitler's concentration camps. If feminists want to argue that the protection of the Constitution should not be extended to any particularly odious or threatening form of speech, they have a reasonable argument (although I don't agree with it). But it is ridiculous to suggest that the porn shops on 42nd Street are more disgusting to women than a march of neo-Nazis is to survivors of the extermination camps. [3] [3] Paragraphs 3, 4: Feminists who want to censor pornography argue that it poses a greater threat to women than similar repulsive speech poses to other groups. They can make this case, but it is absurd to say that pornography is a \"greater threat\" to women than \"neo-Nazi ... extermination camps.\" The arguments over pornography also blur the vital distinction between expression of ideas and conduct. When I say I believe unreservedly in the First Amendment, someone always comes back at me with the issue of \"kiddie porn.\" But kiddie porn is not a First Amendment issue. It is an issue of the abuse of power the power adults have over children and not of obscenity. Parents and promoters have no more right to use their children to make porn movies than they do to send them to work in coal mines. The responsible adults should be prosecuted, just as adults who use children for back-breaking farm labor should be prosecuted. [4] [4] Paragraph 5: Trust in the First Amendment is not refuted by kiddie porn; kiddie porn is an issue of child abuse. 10 Susan Brownmiller, in Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, has described pornography as \"the undiluted essence of antifemale propaganda.\" I think this is a fair description of some types of pornography, especially of the brutish subspecies that equates sex with death and portrays women primarily as objects of violence. The equation of sex and violence, personified by some glossy rock record album covers as well as by Hustler, has fed the illusion that censorship of pornography can be conducted on a more rational basis than other types of censorship. Are all pictures of naked women obscene? Clearly not, says a friend. A Renoir nude is art, she says, and Hustler is trash. \"Any reasonable person\" knows that. But what about something between art and trash something, say, along the lines of Playboy or Penthouse magazines? I asked five women for their reactions to one picture in Penthouse and got responses that ranged from \"lovely\" and \"sensuous\" to \"revolting\" and \"demeaning.\" Feminists, like everyone else, seldom have rational reasons for their preferences in erotica. Like members of juries, they tend to disagree when confronted with something that falls short of 100 percent vulgarity. [5] [5] Paragraphs 6, 7, 8: Some feminists think censorship of pornography can be more \"rational\" than other kinds of censorship, but a picture of a nude woman strikes some women as base and others as \"lovely.\" There is no unanimity. In any case, feminists will not be the arbiters of good taste if it becomes easier to harass, prosecute, and convict people on obscenity charges. Most of the people who want to censor girlie magazines are equally opposed to open discussion of issues that are of vital concern to women: rape, abortion, menstruation, contraception, lesbhianism in fact, the entire range of sexual experience from a woman's viewpoint. Feminist writers and editors and filmmakers have limited financial resources: Confronted by a determined prosecutor, Hugh Hefner will fare better than Susan Brownmiller. Would the Memphis jurors who convicted Harry Reems for his role in Deep Throat be inclined to take a more positive view of paintings of the female genitalia done by sensitive feminist artists? Ms. magazine has printed color reproductions of some of those art works; Ms. is already banned from a number of high school libraries because someone considers it threatening and/or obscene. [6] [6] Paragraphs 9, 10: If feminists censor girlie magazines, they are unwittingly helping opponents of the women's movement censor discussions of rape, abortion, and so on. Feminists who want to censor what they regard as harmful pornography have essentially the same motivation as other would-be censors: They want to use the power of the state to accomplish what they have been unable to achieve in the marketplace of ideas and images. The impulse to censor places no faith in the possibilities of democratic persuasion. Itisn't easy to persuade certain men that they have better uses for $1.95 each month than to spend it on a copy of Hustler. Well, then, give the men no choice in the matter. [7] [7] Paragraphs 11, 12: Like other would-be censors, feminists want to use the power of the state to achieve what they have not achieved in \"the marketplace of ideas.\" They lack faith in \"democratic persuasion.\" I believe there is also a connection between the impulse toward censorship on the part of people who used to consider themselves civil libertarians and a more general desire to shift responsibility from individuals to institutions. When I saw the movie Looking for Mr. Goodbar, 1 was stunned by its series of visual images equating sex and violence, coupled with what seems to me the mindless message (a distortion of the fine Judith Rossner novel) that casual sex equals death. When I came out of the movie, I was even more shocked to see parents standing in line with children between the ages of ten and fourteen. I simply don't know why a parent would take a child to see such a movie, any more than I understand why people feel they can't turn off a television set their child is watching. Whenever I say that, my friends tell me I don't know how itis because I don't have children. True, but I do have parents. When I was a child, they did turn off the TV. They didn't expect the Federal Communications Commission to do their job for them. [8] 15 [8] Paragraphs 13, 14: This attempt at censorship reveals a \"desire to shift responsibility from individuals to institutions.\" The responsibility is properly the parents', I am a First Amendment junkie. You can't OD on the First Amendment, because free speech is its own best antidote. [9] [9] Paragraph 15: We can't have too much of the First Amendment. 1Hugh Hefner Founder and longtime publisher of Playboy magazine. SUMMARIZING JACOBY If you want to present a brief summary in the form of one coherent paragraph perhaps as part of an essay arguing for or against you might write something like the one shown in the paragraph below. (Of course, you would introduce it with a lead-in along these lines: \"Susan Jacoby, writing in the New York Times, offers a forceful argument against censorship of pornography. Jacoby's view, briefly, is....\") When it comes to censorship of pornography, some feminists take a position shared by opponents of the feminist movement. They argue that pornography poses a greater threat to women than other forms of offensive speech offer to other groups, but this interpretation is simply a mistake. Pointing to kiddie porn is also a mistake, for kiddie porn is an issue involving not the First Amendment but child abuse. Feminists who support censorship of pornography will inadvertently aid those who wish to censor discussions of abortion and rape or censor art that is published in magazines such as Ms. The solution is not for individuals to turn to institutions (i.e., for the government to limit the First Amendment) but for individuals to accept the responsibility for teaching young people not to equate sex with violence. In contrast, a critical summary of Jacoby an evaluative summary in which we introduce our own ideas and examples might look like this: Susan Jacoby, writing for the New York Times in 1978, offers a forceful argument against censorship of pornography, [1] but one that does not have foresight of the internet age and the new availability of extreme and exploitative forms of pornography. While she dismisses claims by feminists that pornography should be censored because it constitutes viclence against women, what would Jacoby think of such things as \"revenge porn\" and \"voyeuristic porn\" today or the array of elaborate sadistic fantasies readily available to anyone with access to a search engine? [2] Jacoby says that censoring pornography is a step toward censoring art, and she proudly " wears the tag \"First Amendment junkie,\" ostensibly to protect what she finds artistic (such as images of female genitalia in Ms. magazine). [3] However, her argument does not help us account for these new forms of exploitation and violence v disguised as art or \"free speech.\" [4] Perhaps she would see revenge porn and voyeur porn in the same the way she sees kiddie porn not so much as an issue of free speech but as an issue of other crimes. Perhaps she would hold her position that we can avoid pornography by just \"turning off the TV,\" but the new internet pornography is intrusive, entering our lives and the lives of our children whether we like it or not. Education is part of the solution, Jacoby would agree, but we could also consider... [5] [1] Introduces author, source, and year and characterizes the argument as \"forceful\" [2] Problematizes Jacoby's claims by introducing present-day contexts [3] Explains Jacoby's argument [4] Problematizes Jacoby's claim by pointing out its omissions in the current context [5] Extends Jacoby's argument to a new issue related to today's media environment This example not only summarizes and applies the other techniques presented in this chapter (e.g., accounting for context and questioning definitions of terms and concepts) but also weaves them together with a central argument that offers a new response and a practicable solution. CHARLES R. LAWRENCE |11 Charles R. Lawrence IlI, author of numerous articles in law journals and coauthor of We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action (1997), teaches law at the William S. Richardson School of Law at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa. This essay originally appeared in the Chronicle of Higher Education (October 25, 1989), a publication read chiefly by faculty and administrators at colleges and universities. An amplified version of the essay appeared in the Duke Law Journal (February 1990). On Racist Speech I have spent the better part of my life as a dissenter. As a high school student, [ was threatened with suspension for my refusal to participate in a civil defense drill, and I have been a conspicuous consumer of my First Amendment liberties ever since. There are very strong reasons for protecting even racist speech. Perhaps the most important of these is that such protection reinforces our society's commitment to tolerance as a value, and that by protecting bad speech from government regulation, we will be forced to combat it as a community. But I also have a deeply felt apprehension about the resurgence of racial violence and the corresponding rise in the incidence of verbal and symbolic assault and harassment to which blacks and other traditionally subjugated and excluded groups are subjected. I am troubled by the way the debate has been framed in response to the recent surge of racist incidents on college and university campuses and in response to some universities' attempts to regulate harassing speech. The problem has been framed as one in which the liberty of free speech is in conflict with the elimination of racism. I believe this has placed the bigot on the moral high ground and fanned the rising flames of racism. Above all, I am troubled that we have not listened to the real victims, that we have shown so little understanding of their injury, and that we have abandoned those whose race, gender, or sexual preference continues to make them second-class citizens. It seems to me a very sad irony that the first instinct of civil libertarians has been to challenge even the smallest, most narrowly framed efforts by universities to provide black and other minority students with the protection the Constitution guarantees them. The landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education is not a case that we normally think nf ac a race ahnnt eneerh Rt Rrown can he hraadlv read ac artienlatino the On Racist Speech I have spent the better part of my life as a dissenter. As a high school student, I was threatened with suspension for my refusal to participate in a civil defense drill, and I have been a conspicuous consumer of my First Amendment liberties ever since. There are very strong reasons for protecting even racist speech. Perhaps the most important of these is that such protection reinforces our society's commitment to tolerance as a value, and that by protecting bad speech from government regulation, we will be forced to combat it as a community. But I also have a deeply felt apprehension about the resurgence of racial violence and the corresponding rise in the incidence of verbal and symbolic assault and harassment to which blacks and other traditionally subjugated and excluded groups are subjected. I am troubled by the way the debate has been framed in response to the recent surge of racist incidents on college and university campuses and in response to some universities' attempts to regulate harassing speech. The problem has been framed as one in which the liberty of free speech is in conflict with the elimination of racism. I believe this has placed the bigot on the moral high ground and fanned the rising flames of racism. Above all, I am troubled that we have not listened to the real victims, that we have shown so little understanding of their injury, and that we have abandoned those whose race, gender, or sexual preference continues to make them second-class citizens. It seems to me a very sad irony that the first instinct of civil libertarians has been to challenge even the smallest, most narrowly framed efforts by universities to provide black and other minority students with the protection the Constitution guarantees them. The landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education is not a case that we normally think of as a case about speech. But Brown can be broadly read as articulating the principle of equal citizenship. Brown held that segregated schools were inherently unequal because of the message that segregation conveyed that black children were an untouchable caste, unfit to go to school with white children. If we understand the necessity of eliminating the system of signs and symbols that signal the inferiority of blacks, then we should hesitate before proclaiming that all racist speech that stops short of physical violence must be defended. University officials who have formulated policies to respond to incidents of racial harassment have been characterized in the press as \"thought police,\" but such policies generally do nothing more than impose sanctions against intentional face- to-face insults. When racist speech takes the form of face-to-face insults, catcalls, or other assaultive speech aimed at an individual or small group of persons, it falls directly within the \"fighting words\" exception to First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court has held that words which \"by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace\" are not protected by the First Amendment. If the purpose of the First Amendment is to foster the greatest amount of speech, racial insults disserve that purpose. Assaultive racist speech functions as a preemptive strike. The invective is experienced as a blow, not as a proffered idea, and once the blow is struck, it is unlikely that a dialogue will follow. Racial insults are particularly undeserving of First Amendment protection because the perpetrator's intention is not to discover truth or initiate dialogue but to injure the victim. In most situations, members of minority groups realize that they are likely to lose if they respond to epithets by fighting and are forced to remain silent and submissive. Courts have held that offensive speech may not be regulated in public forums such as streets where the listener may avoid the speech by moving on, but the regulation of otherwise protected speech has been permitted when the speech invades the privacy of the unwilling listener's home or when the unwilling listener cannot avoid the speech. Racist posters, fliers, and graffiti in dormitories, bathrooms, and other common living spaces would seem to clearly fall within the reasoning of these cases. Minority students should not be required to remain in their rooms in order to avoid racial assault. Minimally, they should find a safe haven in their dorms and in all other common rooms that are a part of their daily routine. I'would also argue that the university's responsibility for ensuring that these students receive an equal educational opportunity provides a compelling justification for regulations that ensure them safe passage in all common areas. A minority student should not have to risk becoming the target of racially assaulting speech every time he or she chooses to walk across campus. Regulating vilifying speech that cannot be anticipated or avoided would not preclude announced speeches and rallies situations that would give minoritv-group members and their allies the chance to 10 organize counterdemonstrations or avoid the speech altogether. The most commonly advanced argument against the regulation of racist speech proceeds something like this: We recognize that minority groups suffer pain and injury as the result of racist speech, but we must allow this hate mongering for the benefit of society as a whole, Freedom of speech is the lifeblood of our democratic system. It is especially important for minorities because often it is their only vehicle for rallying support for the redress of their grievances. It will be impossible to formulate a prohibition so precise that it will prevent the racist speech you want to suppress without catching in the same net all kinds of speech that it would be unconscionable for a democratic society to suppress. Whenever we make such arguments, we are striking a balance on the one hand between our concern for the continued free flow of ideas and the democratic process dependent on that flow, and, on the other, our desire to further the cause of equality. There can be no meaningful discussion of how we should reconcile our commitment to equality and our commitment to free speech until it is acknowledged that there is real harm inflicted by racist speech and that this harm is far from trivial. To engage in a debate about the First Amendment and racist speech without a full understanding of the nature and extent of that harm is to risk making the First Amendment an instrument of domination rather than a vehicle of liberation. We have not all known the experience of victimization by racist, misogynist, and homophobic speech, nor do we equally share the burden of the societal harm it inflicts. We are often quick to say that we have heard the cry of the victims when we have not. The Brown case is again instructive because it speaks directly to the psychic injury inflicted by racist speech by noting that the symbolic message of segregation affected \"the hearts and minds\" of Negro children \"in a way unlikely ever to be undone.\" Racial epithets and harassment often cause deep emotional scarring and feelings of anxiety and fear that pervade every aspect of a victim's life. Brown also recognized that black children did not have an equal opportunity to learn and participate in the school community if they bore the additional burden of being subjected to the humiliation and psychic assault contained in the message of segregation. University students bear an analogous burden when they are forced to live and work in an environment where at any moment they may be subjected to denigrating verbal harassment and assault. The same injury was addressed by the Supreme Court when it held that sexual harassment that creates a hostile or abusive work environment violates the ban on sex discrimination in employment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Carefully drafted university regulations would bar the use of words as assault weapons and leave unregulated even the most heinous of ideas when those ideas are presented at times and places and in manners that provide an opportunity for reasoned rebuttal or escape from immediate injury. The history of the development of the right to free speech has been one of carefully evaluating the importance of free expression and its effects on other important societal interests. We have drawn the line between protected and unprotected speech before without dire results. (Courts have, for example, exempted from the protection of the First Amendment obscene speech and speech that disseminates official secrets, that defames or libels another person, or that is used to form a conspiracy or monopoly.) Blacks and other people of color are skeptical about the argument that even the most injurious speech must remain unregulated because, in an unregulated marketplace of ideas, the best ones will rise to the top and gain acceptance. Our experience tells us quite the opposite. We have seen too many good liberal politicians shy away from the issues that might brand them as being too closely allied with us. Whenever we decide that racist speech must be tolerated because of the importance of maintaining societal tolerance for all unpopular speech, we are asking blacks and other subordinated groups to bear the burden for the good of all. We must be careful that the ease with which we strike the balance against the regulation of racist speech is in no way influenced by the fact that the cost will be borne by others. We must be certain that those who will pay that price are fairly represented in our deliberations and that they are heard. At the core of the argument that we should resist all government regulation of speech is the ideal that the best cure for bad speech is good, that ideas that affirm equality and the worth of all individuals will ultimately prevail. This is an empty ideal unless those of us who would fight racism are vigilant and unequivocal in that fight. We must look for ways to offer assistance and support to students whose speech and political participation are chilled in a climate of racial harassment. Civil rights lawyers might consider suing on behalf of blacks whose right to an equal education is denied by a university's failure to ensure a nondiscriminatory educational climate or conditions of employment. We must embark upon the development of a First Amendment jurisprudence grounded in the reality of our history and our contemporary experience. We must think hard about how best to launch legal attacks against the most indefensible forms of hate speech. Good lawyers can create exceptions and narrow interpretations that limit the harm of hate speech without opening the floodgates of censorship. Everyone concerned with these issues must find ways to engage actively in actions that resist and counter the racist ideas that we would have the First Amendment protect. If we fail in this, the victims of hate speech must rightly assume that we are on the oppressors' side. Topics for Critical Thinking and Writing 1. Ifyou previewed and skimmed Charles Lawrence's essay, what kinds of information stood out to you? What could you tell just by reading the first two and last two paragraphs? What important ideas (parts you may have noticed in a more active reading) were not indicated in those paragraphs? 2. Engage in a close reading of paragraphs 5-9, in which Lawrence speaks of regulating \"racially assaulting speech\" and \"vilifying speech\" on campus but not if part of an announced speech or rally. Why does he believe that racially assaultive speech may be banned in some campus locations, while still being protected in others? 3. Write a critical summary of Lawrence's essay in a paragraph of about 200 words. (You may find it useful to use the Introduce, Explain, Exemplify, Problematize, and Extend model in the Visual Guide and refer to our example of a critical summary of Betty Friedan.)