Please help me with the following questions:

5. FIRST PRICE AUCTION (10PTs) Suppose that there are two players, 1 and 2, bidding for a single object in a rst price auction. The players value the object at v1 = '02 = 10. For 55 = 1, 2, let bi denote player 's bid. The players are free to bid any non-negative price they so choose. The player with the highest bid wins the object and pays her own bid. Thus, player is payoff is \"vi t- if she wins and 0 if she loses. When there is a tie, the Winner is player 1. Prove that (10,10) is a unique Nash equilibrium of this game. 6. DOMINANCE (lOPTs) Identify all STRICTLY dominated actions for each player. For each dominated action, identify the strategy that strictly dominates it. Justify your answer. L C R T 2,2 1,3 4,4 M 3,2 4,2 2,4 B 44 23 23 1 I ? 7. FINDING NASH EQUILIBRIA (15PTS) Find all Nash Equilibria (mixed or pure) of the game below. L C R T 2,2 1,3 |4,4 M 3,2 4,2 2,4 B 4,4 2,3 2,3