Please help me with this

Use the following information for Q15 and Q16. Consider an individual with wealth $100. Suppose that with probability 0.1, there is an event of fire and the individual's wealth is reduced to $40. With probability 0.9, there is no fire and the wealth remains $100. Suppose the individual can purchase insurance against the risk of fire. The individual can choose the amount of cover , which will be paid in the event of fire. The insurance premium, R, is determined by the insurance cover, such that R = 0.1F. That is, by choosing an insurance cover F, the wealth level for the individual in the state of no fire is 100 -R = 100-0.1F. His wealth level in the state of fire is 40 + F- R = 40 + F-0.1F = 40 + 0.9F. For example, if the individual purchases insurance cover F = 20, the insurance premium is R = 0.1 = 2. That is, the individual pays insurance premium R = 2 in both states. In the state of fire, the individual gets F = 20 from the insurance company. Q15. If the individual is risk averse, what is the optimal F he should choose? Answer: If there is an increase of insurance premium to R = 0.2F while the probability of fire remains the same. What would happen to the individual's optimal insurance demand? Select one: O a. The individual may still purchase some insurance. But they do not purchase full insurance. O b. The risk averse individual purchases full insurance. " The individual would never purchase any insurance, F = 0