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Collusion in Bertrand Games: Two firms - Firm 1 and Firm 2 - share a market for a specific product. They compete a la Bertrand and the market demand is given by Q = 40 - min{p1, p2}. Both firms have MC = 0. (a) What are equilibrium profits? 1 = 72 = (b) Suppose the two firms agree to a binding collusion contract, i.e., they agree to set the same price and share the market equally. What would be their profits at the collusion price? 71 = 12 = For the following parts, suppose the Bertrand game is played indefinitely and both firms have the same discount factor de [0, 1). (c) Let both players adopt the following strategy: Set Collusion Price if first round or if Collusion done in previous round. Si = (2) Set Bertrand Price if someone has deviated What is the lowest d such that this is an SPNE? (d) Suppose now a policy maker has imposed a price floor p = 8, that is, neither firm is allowed to set a price below $8. Under these conditions and given the strategy from 3), what is the bound on d such that this is an SPNE