Please help with as many parts as possible. All supplemental and needed information for the question is provided.

You recently inherited your family farm. You recently watched Greta Thun berg' s talk at the United Nations, and are worried about climate change and think it will make your income stream more volatile. (a) Briefly describe two ways in which you might deal with this risk. Also describe the pros and cons of each method [6m]. (b) A friend of yours recently started working with an insurance company. She rings you up to catch up on life and you tell her about how you are dealing with your income risk. She asks you what kinds of risks your informal arrangements are not well placed to deal with and formal insurance can help you insure. What would you say to her? [4m] (c) Another friend of yours recently started an economics PhD (he clearly had low opportunity cost of time and limited outside optionsl). He called in at your house while doing fieldwork in your region. Upon hearing about your income volatility, he advises you to buy formal insurance. To persuade you, he shows you some empirical evidence indicating a positive correlation between purchasing formal insurance and farmers' earnings. Would this evidence convince you? If not, explain why and discuss the likely direction of bias. [4m] (d) Fortunately, your friend at the insurance company has some other empirical evidence up her sleeve. She shows you the following table, which Wresults from an experiment by Dean Wand Chris HEW; The authors offered one group of farmers free insurance and gave a cash grant to a second group of farmers. They then compared the agricultural productivity and earnings of both groups of farmers relative to a control group that received neither insurance nor cash grant. Interpret the table. What does it tell you about the binding constraint that smallholder farmers face? [8m] Land fl acres Value of HH has nonfarm llll HH members Total farm HH missed preparation cultivated chemicals income activity working in revenue meal in past costs used {binary} nonfarm activity 12 months Insurance 25.53** 1.02** 37.90** -0.05** 011* 284.98*** -0.03** 'reatmem {12.054} {0.420} {14.354} {0.033} {0.051} {32.99} {0.033} Cash 0.09 55.9M 004 -0.08 55.93 -0.03** grant {0.43) {27.2} {0.033} {0.055} {90.59} {0.037) treatm e nt (e) Motivated by these results, you decide to help the insurance company sell insurance in your region. To inform your sales strategy, you conduct an experiment on insurance demand. You divide farmers into several groups. The first group (Poy W was offered a standard index insurance product, where the premium (Lg, the cost of the insurance product) was paid at the beginning of the season and a payout was made if rainfall was below a certain level. A second group (Pay Upfront with 30% discount} was given a 30% discount on the premium. A third group (Pay Upfront plus Cash) was offered the insurance product and also given an unconditional cash grant. The following graph shows takeup results for the three groups. CK! _. Q _ VA _ h! _. .05 . o - Pay Upfmnt Pay Upfmni P)' Upfl'mt with 30% Discount + Cash Most of your sample said they could not buy the insurance because they could not afford the insurance premium (lg: the cost of the insurance product). Do the results of the experiment support this? [6m] (f) You decide that farming is just too complicated and resolve to sell your farm and move to the city. But tradition in your region dictates that children who inherit land should preserve their ancestral home. Comment on how this norm affects structural transformation. [2m]