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Consider the following oligopolistic market. In the first stage, Firm 1 chooses quantity (11. Firms 2 and 3 observe Firm 1's choice, and then proceed to simultaneously choose Q2 and (I3, respectively. Market demand is given by p(Q) = 100 Q, and Q = q1 + (12 + (13. Firm 1's costs are c1(q1) = 1m, firm 2's costs are 62(42) = M2 and firm 3's costs are 03(43) = 143. Starting from the end of the game, you can express Firm 2's best response function in terms of 11 and 43, and you can similarly express Firm 3's best response function in terms of q1 and (12. Using these, answer the following questions. a) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses (11 = 3, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? b) (0.5 point) If Firm 1 chooses '11 = 100, what quantity will Firm 2 choose? c) (1 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 1 produces what quantity? d) (0.5 point) In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, firm 2 and firm 3 each produce what quantity