Please refer to the following question:

The market for cellular service is dominated by two firms: Rogers (firm 1) and Bell (firm 2). They are Bertrand competitors which provide heterogeneous services to consumers. The demand for firm 1's service is q1 = 100 - p, + p2, and the demand for firm 2's service is q2 = 100 - p2 + p,, where q; is the number of customers for firm / and p; is the price charged by firm / (where / = 1 or 2). The marginal cost of providing the service is $100 per consumer for firm 1 and $60 per consumer for firm 2. Suppose firm 1 sets its price first and then firm 2 responds. By following the procedures similar to Stackelberg equilibrium, solve for firm 1's profit-maximizing price, quantity and profit in this price-setting sequential duopoly