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Davis v. United States

for counsel. He was convicted of murder, and, ultimately, the Court of Military Appeals affirmed.] JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opin- ion of the Court. In Edwards v. Arizona, we held that law enforcement officers must immediately cease questioning a suspect who has clearly asserted his right to have counsel present during cus- todial interrogation. In this case, we decide how law enforcement officers should respond when a suspect makes a reference to coun- sel that is insufficiently clear to invoke the Edwards prohibition on further questioning.DAVIS V. UNITED STATES 512 U.S. 452, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994) [Citations and footnotes omitted.] [On October 3, 1988, the body of a sailor, beaten to death with a pool cue, was found at the Charleston Naval Base. The investiga- tion gradually focused on Davis. A month later, Davis was interviewed by the Naval Investigative Service. The agents advised Davis that he was a suspect in the killing, that he was not required to make a statement, that any statement could be used against him at a trial by court-martial, and that he was entitled to speak with an attorney and have an attorney present during questioning. Davis waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing. About an hour and a half into the interview, Davis said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." When the agents inquired whether he wanted a lawyer, he responded that he did not. The interview continued for another hour, at which point Davis said, "I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else," at which point question- ing ceased. A military judge denied Davis's motion to suppress statements made at the interview, holding that his mention of a law- yer during the interrogation was not a requestThe applicability of the "rigid' prophylactic rule" of Edwards requires courts to "determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel." To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel "requires at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney." But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer, in light of the circumstances, would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. ("The likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test for applicability of Edwards"). Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request counsel. As we have observed, "a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not." Although a suspect need not "speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don," he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer, in the circumstances, would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect. We decline petitioner's invitation to extend Edwards and require law enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. The rationale underlying Edwards is that theThe right to counsel recognized in Miranda is sufficiently important to suspects in criminal investigations, we have held, that it "requir[es] the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard." If the suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warn- ings, law enforcement officers are free to question him. But if a suspect requests coun- sel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect him- self reinitiates conversation. This "second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel," is "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previ- ously asserted Miranda rights," To that end. we have held that a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel cannot be questioned regarding any offense unless an attorney is actually present. "It remains clear, however, that this prohibition on further questioning like other aspects of Miranda-is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's prohibit tion on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose." The applicability of the "*rigid" prophylac tic rule" of Edwards requires courts to "deter- mine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel." To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective Copyrig s boxes DefiningWe decline petitioner's invitation to extend Edwards and require law enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. The rationale underly- ing Edwards is that the police must respect a suspect's wishes regarding his right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. But when the officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not know whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation of questioning "would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irra- tional obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity," because it would needlessly prevent the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present. Nothing