Please review my opinion in the persona of Chief Roberts and provide any suggestions that would improve his opinion.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

Chief Justice Roberts, Concurring in part, Dissenting in part.

In the matter before us of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the Court is asked to reconsider the "Chevron Reference Doctrine", established by the 1984 Supreme Court case Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This case serves as fundamental to administrative law as the Supreme Court determined how courts should review administrative agencies interpretation of the statute. In this case the court addressed a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agencies (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Air Act. In a unanimous decision the court established the Chevron doctrine, which sets forth a two-step process for judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes: First, courts must determine if Congress has directly addressed the issue at hand. If not, courts then assess if the agency's interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute. This landmark ruling underscored that agencies have the authority, delegated by Congress, to be the primary interpreters of the statutes they enforce, given their subject matter expertise and democratic accountability. This framework aims to balance the technical expertise of agencies with judicial oversight, acknowledging that agencies are often better positioned to navigate complex regulatory issues.

The case of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo raises specific troubles that touch upon the core principles and criticisms of the Chevron Doctrine. First, the central administrative law question in this case is whether the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), which governs fisheries management and allows for the requirement of federal observers on vessels to prevent overfishing, also implicitly authorizes the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to require the fishing industry to bear the costs of these observers. The statute explicitly authorizes the presence of monitors but is silent on the matter of who should pay for them. The D.C. Circuit's decision to defer to the NMFS's interpretation highlights a contentious point about the extent to which agencies can infer powers from statutory silence, raising concerns about the breadth of agency discretion and the limits of implied authorization. Beyond the immediate administrative law question, the case also presents an opportunity to reevaluate the Chevron doctrine itself. The petitioners argue for either an overruling of Chevron or, at minimum, a clarification on how courts should handle statutory silence, particularly concerning the delegation of controversial powers narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute. This aspect of the case challenges the doctrine's foundational principle that courts should defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, questioning whether statutory silence constitutes such ambiguity and, therefore, whether it should trigger deference.

Over the past several decades, the Chevron Doctrine has profoundly influenced administrative law by affording federal agencies considerable leeway in interpreting statutes and shaping federal regulations. This doctrine, while instrumental, inherently modifies the nature of judicial review, prompting courts to affirm agency interpretations whenever deemed permissible. This, in turn, diminishes the frequency of agency decisions being overturned. Although Chevron deference acknowledges the specialized expertise of agencies within their domains, it is crucial that such deference does not diminish the judiciary's pivotal role in statutory interpretation. The Constitution establishes a careful balance of powers, positioning the judiciary not as a passive observer but as an integral force in ensuring the faithful application of laws as envisioned by Congress. As elucidated in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference only under clear Congressional delegation of decision-making authority. Critics argue that Chevron deference inadvertently grants "unaccountable bureaucrats" excessive power, threatening to erode democratic principles and the separation of powers by enabling executive agencies to assume a quasi-legislative role through interpretation. Given these considerations, it becomes imperative to narrow the scope of the Chevron Doctrine, ensuring it aligns more closely with its intended purpose and the constitutional mandate for a balanced government.

The Chevron two-step process, designed to mediate the interplay between legislative intent and agency expertise, has increasingly spotlighted the critical importance of the doctrine's first step: the determination of statutory clarity. A more robust inquiry into the meaning of the statute at this initial stage necessitates a deeper engagement with the text and context of legislation. This approach reflects a judiciary that is vigilant in its duty to uphold the rule of law and ensures that deference to agency interpretation is truly warranted by legislative ambiguity and not merely presumed. Recent terms of the Court, particularly as illustrated by the decision in King v. Burwell, highlight a trend towards more vigilant scrutiny in statutory interpretation. This case exemplifies the judiciary's comprehensive approach to analyzing statutory language, demonstrating that our hesitance to quickly deem statutes ambiguous is not a withdrawal from respecting agency expertise but rather a reaffirmation of our fundamental duty in statutory interpretation. In King v. Burwell, the Court directly interpreted the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) provisions without deferring to the agency's interpretation, underscoring the principle that clear statutory mandates should be discerned by the judiciary whenever possible. This approach, supported by Justice Kavanaugh and others on the bench, emphasizes a cautious stance towards finding ambiguity, which naturally restricts cases from advancing to Chevron's second step, where agency interpretations are given deference. This careful approach to determining ambiguity ensures that deference is reserved for truly ambiguous statutory contexts, thereby maintaining the judiciary's essential role in the interpretation of laws.

Additionally, I propose to narrow the scope of Chevron through the application of "Major Questions Doctrine". This doctrine has been applied to numerous cases where the Supreme Court has resisted deferring to agency's interpretations under Chevron due to the disputed interpretation involved a question of "such economic and political magnitude" that Congress unlikely implicitly delegated authority to the relevant agency in resolving such a question. In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the central issue revolves around whether the (MSA) authorizes the (NMFS) to impose financial burdens on the fishing industry for compliance monitoringa question that, akin to King v. Burwell, carries significant economic implications and lies at the heart of the statutory scheme. The appellate court's decision to defer to the (NMFS), predicated on an interpretation of statutory silence as ambiguity warranting Chevron Step Two deference, precisely exemplifies the concerns that the Major Questions Doctrine seeks to address.

Therefore, guided by the rationale established in King v. Burwell, and acknowledging the judiciary's critical role in the statutory interpretation process, I propose a recalibration of the Chevron framework. This recalibration should prioritize a rigorous examination of statutory language and intent at Chevron's Step One, reserving deference for instances where Congress's intent is genuinely inscrutable and explicitly delegated. By doing so, we ensure that significant regulatory decisions, which may have far-reaching economic and political impacts, receive the meticulous judicial scrutiny they warrant. This recalibration does not dilute the importance of agency expertise but underscores the primacy of Congress's role in legislating and the judiciary's duty in interpreting those laws. Such an approach ensures that agency deference is accorded only where Congress's intent is genuinely inscrutable, thereby preserving the separation of powers by preventing agencies from occupying a quasi-legislative role.

Many critics argue that narrowing Chevron might lead to judicial overreach and stifle the agencies' ability to effectively manage complex regulatory landscapes. However, this perspective overlooks the fundamental principle that agencies operate within a statutory grant of authority. I assert that a more rigorous analysis at Chevron's Step One and the prudent application of the Major Questions Doctrine are measures designed to uphold the integrity of this grant. These measures do not detract from the value of specialized knowledge agencies bring to statutory interpretation; instead, they ensure such interpretation does not extend beyond the legislative mandate. This approach reaffirms the judiciary's role as a guardian of the Constitution, ensuring that the separation of powers is maintained and that significant policy shifts receive the level of scrutiny they warrant. This recalibration is a testament to our commitment to the rule of law and the principles of representative democracy. It reflects a judicious balance between leveraging agency expertise in regulatory matters and safeguarding against the potential erosion of the legislative process by executive interpretation. In this light, our decision should be viewed not as a constraint on regulatory agencies but as a reinforcement of their rightful role within our constitutional framework, ensuring that their actions remain firmly rooted in the authority that has been duly delegated by Congress.