Please see question below.

(15 pts) At one point in time it was estimated that more than 400,000 apps on Apple's iOS app store had never been purchased even a single time. These \"zombie apps" made up 2 / 3rds of the app catalog! Let's build a simple model to understand Why this might happen and how it might be xed. Suppose all apps are either \"high quality' or \"low quality' and are otherwise undifferentiated. Con sumers are willing to pay $5.00 for an app they know is high quality, but only $0.30 for an app they know is low quality. Suppose that the supply of apps can be given by the following equations: a For high quality apps: P = 0.50 + 0.5623 0 For low quality apps: P = 0.1QL (In both equations P is price per app, Q is in thousands of apps produced.) (a) (2 pts) If consumers can tell the quality of an app before purchase, what will happen? I.e., what will be the price and quantity sold of both high- and low-quality apps? (b) (3 pts} Suppose consumers can't tell the quality of an app before purchase. Suppose they think that there is a 50% chance it's of high quality. Assume consumers are risk neutral. What will happen? (I.e., what quantityr of high- and low-quality apps will be sold?) 'What's the real chance that an app is of high quality? (c) (3 pts) Suppose consumers update their beliefs so that they think the chance of a highquality app is the real chance you got in the previous part. With these beliefs, What will be the quantity of high and lowquality apps will be sold? (d) (2 pts) \"That's the equilibrium? I.e., if consumers continue updating their beliefs (as you did above) , what will eventually be the price of an app and the quantity of high and low-quality apps sold? (e) (3 pts) Comparing the situation in part {a} (full information), with the equilibrium in the previous part (asymmetric information), are consumers better or worse o? Are high- and low-quality app producers better or worse off? (f) (2 pts) Suggest some strategies that high quality app producers might use to mitigate this