Please see the attached screenshot (easier to read):

Consider a toy model of interaction between the MBTA Transit Police and riders. There is a ne f > 0 for being caught freeriding, so riders prefer to pay $3 for the ride if they are checked. Otherwise, they prefer to freeride and keep the $3. Checking is costly, so the Transit Police incur a cost of $1 if they check, irrespective of whether the rider has paid the fare or is freeriding. However, when they do catch a freerider, the moral satisfaction offsets the cost of checking, so they get the payoff of 333+ f in this case. The game can be represented in the following normal form RIDER Pay FreeRide Check 1,3 3 + f, 3 f META POLICE Don't Check 0, 3 0,3 (a) Find the mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium of the game as a function of ne f. What is the optimal rate of screening and fare compliance? (b) How do the optimal rate of screening and fare compliance change with f? (c) Could the law-makers set a value of ne f to deliver perfect fare compliance in equi librium? If so, what is it