please show steps

Question 14) Boeing and Airbus have 2 possible actions each: keep producing the current (\"Old\") aircraft models or introduce the new (\"New\") ones. The old models are well-tested, and known to be safe. The new models can either be good (safe) or bad ( prone to air crashes). Assume that the quality of the new models is the same for Boeing and Airbus (i.e.,either both are good, or both are bad). If the new model is good Boeing and Airbus strategies and payoff matrix are given by the following table: Boeing Old New Airbus 01d 3,3 2,4 New 4,2 1,1 The strategic form of the game reects the fact that switching from the old model to the new one is costly and makes sense only if the other company keeps producing the old model. In that case, the company that introduces the new model, grabs part of the market of the competitor. Switching to the new models simultaneously is not profitable, because the companies have to split prots. If the new model is bad Boeing and Airbus strategies and payoff matrix are given by the following table: Boeing Old New Airbus Old 3, 3 4, -1 New -1, 4 -1, -1 The strategic form of the game reects the fact that if the new model is bad, the company that produced it experiences a loss. If the other company keeps producing the old model, it gets part of the market of the competitor. Boeing and Airbus choose their actions simultaneously. (a) Describe all (if any) pure strategies Nash equilibria in the case when the new model is good. (b) Describe all (if any) pure strategies Nash equilibria in the case when the new model is good. (c) Suppose that the quality of the new model is not known. Let n E (0, 1) denote the probability of the event that the new model is good. Write down the strategic form of the game for this case and analyze how pure strategies Nash equilibria depend on the value of at. (d) Let 1: = 0.9. If Boeing and Airbus are allowed to randomize their behavior, what will be the equilibrium strategies and payoffs