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Consider the following dynamic game under incomplete information. First, nature selects the type of player one to be either strong ($) or weak (W) with equal probability. Having observed his/her type, player one selects between action L and action R. Player two observes the action player one took, but not his/her type. Conditional on this observation, player two selects an action, U or D. Then both players receive their payoffs according to: 1/2 U D 1/2 D S : 1, 2 2,0 W : 0,0 3, 1 RS 0, 1 3,0 RW 1,0 2, 2 Here, the matrices denoted by S and W indicate the relevant payoffs when player one's type is S or W, respectively. (a) Draw the extensive form of this game. (b) How many subgames are there? (c) Carefully derive the (pure-strategy) equilibria, if they exist. What is the appro- priate solution concept in this game