please solve part 1 only

Question There is an oligopolistic market with three firms: A, B, and C. The market demand is Q=300-2P. Firm A's cost is TCA=75Q. Firm B's cost is TCB=65Q. Firm C's cost is TCc=60Q. Assume that the three firms compete by setting prices (Bertrand Game). a. If firm A's price is PA=100 and firm B's price is PB=95, what is firm C's best response? Give your result with two decimal places. b. At Nash equilibrium, what is the price charged by each firm? c. At Nash equilibrium, what is the quantity sold by each firm? d. At Nash equilibrium, what is each firm's profit? part 2 Now assume that the three firms compete by choosing quantities (Cournot Game). Let QA represent firm A's quantity, QB firm B's quantity, and Qc firm C's quantity. e. Find each firm's inverse residual demand. f. Find each firm's residual marginal revenue. g. Find each firm's reaction function. h. At Nash equilibrium, what is the quantity sold by each firm? i. At Nash equilibrium, what is the market price? j. At Nash equilibrium, what is each firm's profit? k. At Nash equilibrium, what is each firm's markup (Lerner index)