pls answer all parts

Consider a market served by two firms: firm A and firm B. Demand for the goor is given (in inverse form) by P(Q)=4002.00Q. where Q is total quantity in the market (and is the sum of firm A 's output, 4A, and firm B 's output, 4b ) and P is the price of the good. Each firm has a cost function of c(q)=160.00q. . Which implies marginal cost of $160.00 for each firm, and the goods sold by firms A and B are identical. 1 st attempt Part 1 (2points) Oe Feedback If the two firms compete in price (Bertrand competition) then each of them will set price of 3 s and earn profit of (?) (Give your answers to two decimal places) Part 2 (3 points) Feedback Now sungose that the two firms compete by setting quantities (Cournot competition). In equllibrium they will each produce units and the price of the good will be $ s Each firm will earn profit of (Give your answers to two decimal places.) Consider a market served by two firms: firm A and firm B. Demand for the goor is given (in inverse form) by P(Q)=4002.00Q. where Q is total quantity in the market (and is the sum of firm A 's output, 4A, and firm B 's output, 4b ) and P is the price of the good. Each firm has a cost function of c(q)=160.00q. . Which implies marginal cost of $160.00 for each firm, and the goods sold by firms A and B are identical. 1 st attempt Part 1 (2points) Oe Feedback If the two firms compete in price (Bertrand competition) then each of them will set price of 3 s and earn profit of (?) (Give your answers to two decimal places) Part 2 (3 points) Feedback Now sungose that the two firms compete by setting quantities (Cournot competition). In equllibrium they will each produce units and the price of the good will be $ s Each firm will earn profit of (Give your answers to two decimal places.)