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Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies Consider a game G = ( (S;) , wien,2) such that S1 = {up, down} S2 = {left, right} and the vNM utility function u; : S1 X S2 - R is given by the following payoff matrix left right up 1,1 0.0 down 0.0 x, x with a 2 1. Denote by 01 = (1 (up) , 1 -01 (up)) the mixed strategy of player 1 by which he plays up with probability 1 (up). Accordingly, denote by 02 = (02 (left) , 1 -02 (left)) the mixed strategy of player 2 by which he plays left with probability o2 (left). 1. Derive the individual best response correspondences of player 1, 41 : (S2) - 24($1), and of player 2, 42 : A (S1) - 24($2). 2. Determine all Nash equilibria in mixed strategies for this game