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plz answer me in detail. thx a lot! 2. Consider an nplayer rst-price sealed-bid auction in which the bidders' valuations on a good are independently

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plz answer me in detail. thx a lot!

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2. Consider an nplayer rst-price sealed-bid auction in which the bidders' valuations on a good are independently and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. The bids bi 2 0 with 1 S i S n are submitted simultaneously. Bidder 2' has valuation 1),; for the good, that is, if bidder 3' Wins the auction she gets the good but pas her own bid bi, earning 1).; bi as payoff While the other bids get 0 as payoff. In case of a tie, the Winner is distributed uniformly at random. Give a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium linear in the valuation. [5 points]

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