plz only answer d, e , f, and g

thanks

Two computer firms, A and B, are planning to market network systems for office information management. Each firm can develop either a fast, high-quality system (High), or a slower, low-quality system (Low). Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are as follows: Firm B High Low High 50,40 60, 45 Firm A Low 55,55 15, 20 (a) (2 points) Which firm has a dominant strategy? (b) (3 points) If each firm is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what is the resulting equilibrium? Explain. (c) (3 points) Find the Nash equilibrium for this game (if any), assuming that both firms make their decisions at the same time. Explain. (d) (5 points) Suppose that both firms try to maximize profits, but Firm A has a head start in planning and can commit first. What will be the outcome? How will the outcome change if Firm B has the head start in planning and can commit first? (e) (1 point) If there a first-mover advantage in this game? (f) (4 points) Getting a head start costs money. (You have to gear up a large engineering team.) Now consider the two-stage game in which, first, each firm decides how much money to spend to speed up its planning, and, second, it announces which product (H or L) it will produce. Which firm will spend more to speed up its planning? How much will it spend? (g) (4 points) Should Firm A spend anything to speed up its planning if it knows that Firm B has also sped up its planning? Explain. Two computer firms, A and B, are planning to market network systems for office information management. Each firm can develop either a fast, high-quality system (High), or a slower, low-quality system (Low). Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are as follows: Firm B High Low High 50,40 60, 45 Firm A Low 55,55 15, 20 (a) (2 points) Which firm has a dominant strategy? (b) (3 points) If each firm is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what is the resulting equilibrium? Explain. (c) (3 points) Find the Nash equilibrium for this game (if any), assuming that both firms make their decisions at the same time. Explain. (d) (5 points) Suppose that both firms try to maximize profits, but Firm A has a head start in planning and can commit first. What will be the outcome? How will the outcome change if Firm B has the head start in planning and can commit first? (e) (1 point) If there a first-mover advantage in this game? (f) (4 points) Getting a head start costs money. (You have to gear up a large engineering team.) Now consider the two-stage game in which, first, each firm decides how much money to spend to speed up its planning, and, second, it announces which product (H or L) it will produce. Which firm will spend more to speed up its planning? How much will it spend? (g) (4 points) Should Firm A spend anything to speed up its planning if it knows that Firm B has also sped up its planning? Explain