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Economics Consider the following signalling game between a worker (who can be of two types: good and bad) and an employer. 20, 5 10, 5 no uni Good worker uni -4.0 1/5 Employer Nature Employer 4/5 20, -5 no uni Bad worker uni 4,0 -11,0 Is there a separating equilibrium in this game? Select one: O a. No O b. Yes, and the employer hires everyone O c. Yes, and the employer hires no one O d. Yes, and the employer hires only the educated Is there a pooling equilibrium in this game in which all workers go to uni? Select one: O a. No O b. Yes, and the employer hires everyone O c. Yes, and the employer hires no one O d. Yes, and the employer hires only the educated Is there a pooling equilibrium in this game in which no workers go to uni? Select one: O a. No O b. Yes, and the employer hires everyone O c. Yes, and the employer hires no one O d. Yes, and the employer hires only the educated Consider a variation on the game in the previous question: now, the payoff for the employer of hiring a bad worker is -3, while the payoff of hiring a good worker is a. This game has a pooling equilibrium in everyone goes to uni and in which the employer hires all educated workers if a is greater than or equal to _ Suppose x: = 22. There is a pooling equilibrium in which everyone goes to uni and in which the employer hires all educated workers. In this PBE, when the employer sees an uneducated worker, the employer believes that the uneducated worker is good with a probability less than or equal to _. (Please input "1" if any beliefs work in this PBE).Consider the following signalling game between a worker (who can be of two types: good and bad) and an employer. 20,5 h h 10,5 no uni Good worker uni 6,0 n n -4, 0 1/5 Employer Nature Employer 4/5 20, -5 h 5,-5 h no uni Bad worker uni 4.0 n n -11, 0 Is there a separating equilibrium in this game? Select one: O a. No O b. Yes, and the employer hires everyone O c. Yes, and the employer hires no one O d. Yes, and the employer hires only the educatedConsider a variation on the game in the previous question: now, the payoff for the employer of hiring a bad worker is 3, while the payoff of hiring a good worker is z. This game has a pooling equilibrium in everyone goes to uni and in which the employer hires all educated workers if a: is greater than or equal to ? E Suppose 2 : 22. There is a pooling equilibrium in which everyone goes to uni and in which the employer hires all educated workers. In this PEE, when the employer sees an uneducated worker, the employer believes that the uneducated worker is good with a probability less than or equal to . (Please input '1 ' if any beliefs work in this PBE). E Is there a pooling equilibrium in this game in which all workers go to uni? Select one: O a. No O b. Yes, and the employer hires everyone O c. Yes, and the employer hires no one O d. Yes, and the employer hires only the educated