Pol-Sei 230 Fri soner's Dilemma N arm: 1. Identify (oirolefhighlight) all Nash Equilibria in the game shown below. 2. What are the players' preference orderings? P]: b > > P2: > > > 2. Do the players have dominant strategies? If so, what are they? 3. How do the players best respond in this game? In other words, if I know what the other player is doing, what should I do? Comedy Drama Comedy 2, 1 0, 0 Drama 0, 0 1, 2 Beth and Greg would like to see a movie together. Beth [player 1) prefers comedies, but Greg (P2) prefers dramas. If they go to different movies, they will both be equally unhappy, regardless of which movie they see. 1. Identify (circlefhighlight) all Nash Equilibria in the game shown below. 2. What are the players' preference orderings? Pl: 3 > > P2; 3 > > 2. Do the players have dominant strategies? If so, what are they? 3. How do the players best respond in this game? In other words, if I know what the other player is doing, what should I do? 4. [How] does the game change if Pl believes that P2's payoff for the outcome dened by RA is 0, 3'? What if Pl believes it is 0, 4'? Refrain Arm Refrain 3, 3 0, 2 Arm 2, 0 1, 1 Two countries are determining whether to arm themselves or refrain from arming. Each country prefers the outcome in which both refrain from aiming to the one in which it alone arms itself: the cost of arming outweighs the benet if the other country does not arm itself